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ABSTRACT 
This thesis builds on the research and ideas of the school of thought that believes 
strategy is the most important factor in predicting war outcomes.  One shortcoming of 
that school is the inability to explain why strong actors would implement a strategy that 
does not provide the highest probability of victory.  This project uses a game theoretic 
model to illustrate how a seemingly non-optimal strategy may be rational for initial 
phases of the conflict.  However, this rationale does not apply beyond initial stages of 
conflict.  To explain non-optimal strategy selection in prolonged conflicts, this project 
analyzes strategy drivers—factors that influence strategy selection and implementation.  
Probability of victory is only one of the factors found to influence strategy 
implementation.  Other than probability of victory, this study finds that the institutional 
predisposition of a military is the most important because it is the most consistent and the 
most controllable by the military.  With this conceptual basis, the project analyzes U.S. 
involvement in Afghanistan since 2001.  It also takes a cursory look at U.S. operations in 
Iraq since 2003, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and the U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam.  The model and case studies illustrate a U.S. military 
institutional predisposition with an excessive disposition towards direct attack.  As such, 
this thesis recommends taking action to provide the U.S. military with a more neutral 
institutional predisposition. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Force is all-conquering, but its victories are short-lived. 
— Abraham Lincoln 
 
A. AVOIDANCE IS NOT AN OPTION  
The United States military has been a powerhouse fighting machine with victories 
against strong opponents in the Revolutionary War, World War I, World War II, and the 
Cold War.  However, the inability of the U.S. military to secure victory against the much 
weaker forces of North Vietnam greatly rattled the confidence of the U.S. political and 
military forces.  From this uncertainty of how to use military power came the Weinberger 
doctrine, which called for the involvement of the U.S. military only as a last resort in 
conflicts over vital interests that necessitate the use of overwhelming conventional 
military force against an identifiable foe.1  This type of warfare is well suited to the 
American way of war, and thus gave the U.S. a marked advantage.  In his book Beating 
Goliath, Jeffrey Record reiterated the basic premises of the Weinberger doctrine when he 
recommended the U.S. avoid counterinsurgency warfare.2  However, his 
recommendation is more suited as a business strategy for a company that has the luxury 
of selecting its operating environment; it is not realistic for a military expected to succeed 
in any environment along the entire spectrum of war in which the nation orders the 
military into action.   
The collapse of the USSR and the increasingly networked and interrelated global 
order that has developed in the wake of the bipolar world has led to frequent justification 
for U.S. military intervention in conflicts that do not conform to the tenets of the 
Weinberger doctrine or Record’s recommendations.  In these conflicts, the U.S. is likely 
to face enemies with capabilities and interests asymmetrical to those of the U.S., as 
 
1 Caspar W. Weinberger, The Uses of Military Power (address to the National Press Club, 
Washington, D. C., November 28, 1984) (accessed November 15, 2009). 
2 Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 
2007), 137. 
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evidenced by involvement in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as well as against various 
non-state actors.  Like the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, the U.S. has experienced 
difficulty in securing victory against these weaker foes.   
B. NEED FOR A THEORY 
If the U.S. intends to remain the global hegemon, it needs to understand 
asymmetric conflicts as thoroughly as possible because future conflicts will likely be 
against significantly weaker enemies.  Over the last 200 years of asymmetric conflicts3 
such as those the U.S. is likely to face, the weak actors have been victorious in almost 
41% of the wars.4  The high probability of the U.S. military engaging in future 
asymmetric conflicts, coupled with the relatively low probability of victory, underscores 
the need to understand the variables leading to victory or defeat more fully.     
C. THESIS 
The question this thesis intends to answer is: Why are strong actors, who are 
theoretically free to select any strategy in war, frequently driven to employ a strategy that 
does not maximize the probability of victory?  In answering this question, this paper uses 
game theory to show that strong actors often employ strategies that are not optimal for 
achieving victory.  It then explores the factors that are used in determining a military 
strategy to explore reasons a sub-optimal strategy would be employed. 
The purpose of this thesis is to bolster the “employment” school of thought of 
predicting war outcomes.  This school views strategy as the most significant determinant 
of war outcomes.  Presently, the most convincing shortfall of this school is the failure to 
explain sub-optimal strategies; this project offers a rational explanation for sub-optimal 
strategies and builds upon the existing strategy literature. 
 
3 For the purposes of this paper, an asymmetric conflict is one in which one actor is significantly 
stronger than the other.  Addressed in more detail later, this paper uses “the halved product of one actor’s 
armed forces and population exceeded the simple product of its adversary’s armed forces and population by 
> 5:1” to establish asymmetry.  Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric 
Conflict,” International Security 26, no. 1 (2001), 110. 
4 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Principles of International Politics: People’s Power, Preferences, and 
Perceptions, Third Edition ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006), 266. 
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II.   REVIEW OF WAR OUTCOME EXPLANATIONS 
War is of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the 
road to survival or ruin.  It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied. 
 – Sun Tzu 
Various theories have been posited in order to explain war outcomes.  According 
to Napoleon, “God is on the side of the big battalions.”5  This statement summarizes well 
the theory that the actor with the most power will win the war.  Power can be defined 
many different ways but, in the most comprehensive measures, it involves material and 
numerical strength corrected for technological advancement.  While some studies support 
the theory of power as the primary determinant of success, Bueno de Mesquita showed 
that weak states won 41% of the wars in the last 200 years.6  Forty-one percent is quite 
close to a coin flip, and therefore probably not the best predictor of outcomes.  Although 
arguments can be made about the definitions and measurements of power that result in 
differing percentages of conflicts that favor the weaker side, the fact remains that the 
weak win quite regularly, making power a poor predictor of war outcomes.  Two 
precipitous shortcomings of the power school of thought are the failure to address relative 
stake and the omittance of how military power is employed. 
To fill the first void, the relative stake school of thought was born, of which 
Andrew Mack may be the leading proponent.7  This camp looks at the importance of 
what each side risks and uses terms such as “interest” and “resolve” to explain victory 
and defeat.8  The causal mechanism linking stake, interest and resolve to victory in these 
theories generally centers around political vulnerability.  These theories argue that weak 
actors are fighting for survival and therefore the weak actor population is willing to 
 
5 Quoted in Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 14. 
6 Bueno de Mesquita, Principles of International Politics: People’s Power, Preferences, and 
Perceptions. 
7 To review his relative interest argument, see Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: 
The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World Politics 27, no. 2 (1975), 175–200. 
8 Robert Anthony Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 4.  
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accept a bloody, drawn-out conflict in order to survive.  Thus, weak actors have more at 
stake, which leads to higher interest, higher resolve, and lower political vulnerability.  
Conversely, the survival of strong actors is almost never threatened by the weak.  With 
less at stake, the strong have lower interests and resolve.  They expect quick, decisive 
wins.  When strong actors experience battlefield failures or even just fail to attain victory 
quickly, the public becomes war-weary and unwilling to commit the resources required 
for victory.9  Arreguín-Toft argues that relative stake arguments are quite convincing in 
explaining strong actor failure as a consequence of political vulnerability but leave much 
to be desired when attempting to explain interest solely as a function of power.10  
Additionally, these theories fail to explain why weak actors, with more at stake, greater 
resolve, and less political vulnerability, are not always able to attain victory against the 
strong. 
Another school of thought that has emerged attributes war outcomes less to power 
and relative stake and more to the manner in which the military is employed—meaning 
doctrine, strategy, and tactics.  This camp has many proponents, including Gartner, 
Biddle, and Arreguín-Toft.  Gartner avoids the direct analysis of strategy and instead 
investigates information used to decide to continue with or change a generic strategy 
choice once adopted.11   Biddle makes his case at the tactical level and restricts his scope 
to “explain the outcomes of operations to control territory” so it has limited use at a 
strategic level across different types of conflict.12  Arreguín-Toft gives a very useful 
approach for a broad framework of analyzing military strategy.  In order to adequately 
capture the strategic interaction typology of Arreguín-Toft and expound upon his ideas, 
we need to look closely at his theory of asymmetric conflict, which he terms “strategic 
interaction.” 
 
9 Mack, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict, 175–200. 
10 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, 99. 
11 Scott Sigmund Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1997). 
12 Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, 6. 
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Before delving directly into strategic interaction, we first need to look at 
Arreguín-Toft’s strategy differentiation between direct and indirect, which he uses to 
create a typology.  Arreguín-Toft distinguishes between strategy types based upon the 
intended target.  By and large, he views direct as related to targeting capacity and indirect 
as related to targeting will.13  These two approaches are aimed at destroying the enemy 
either materially or morally.   
This distinction is similar to other categorizations, such as that made by the 
German historian Hans Delbrück.  Delbrück viewed strategies as one of two types:  either 
a strategy of annihilation, which was to overthrow an enemy rapidly by sheer power; or a 
strategy of attrition, which was intended to defeat the enemy slowly by erosion or 
exhaustion.14  The Soviet strategist Major General Aleksandr Svechin termed these same 
basic concepts as destruction and attrition.15  French strategist Général d’Armée André 
Beaufre used the same descriptors as Arreguín-Toft of direct and indirect, but in 
definition his categorizations were almost identical to those of Delbrück and Svechin.16   
Where the aforementioned thinkers divided strategy types based mostly on time 
and force elements, Edward Luttwak viewed the essential characteristic of strategy as 
their focus of effectiveness—either internal or external.17  The internally focused army 
attempts to maximize internal efficiency in order to bring maximum firepower to bear 
upon the enemy.  Luttwak terms this the strategy of attrition.  This strategy is ideally 
suited to conventional wars since it views all conflicts as essentially the same.  This 
strategy is generally how highly industrialized societies fight wars.  The opposite 
strategy, relational-maneuver, looks outward and focuses on the enemy.  This strategy 
looks for efficiency in exploiting the weaknesses specific to the particular enemy in one 
 
13 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, 93–128. 
14 Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, trans. W. J. 
Renfroe Jr. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975. Original work published in 1908), 293–315. 
15 Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, ed. Kent D. Lee, trans. Kent D. Lee (Minneapolis, MN: East View 
Publications, 1992. Original work published in 1927), 94–99. 
16  André Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, with Particular Reference to Problems of Defense, 
Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age, trans. R. H. Barry (New York: Fredrick A. 
Praeger, 1965), 107–110. 
17  Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Parameters 13, no. 4 (1983), 11–18. 
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specific conflict.  In order to use this strategy, the army forfeits internal efficiency by 
adapting and reorganizing and is generally used when military has limited options.   
David Tucker and Christopher Lamb, both with extensive backgrounds studying 
Special Operations and Special Operations Forces, also divided employment methods 
into direct and indirect.  Their categorization is based largely on Luttwak’s ideas of 
attrition and relational-maneuver.  However, the Tucker and Lamb categorizations divide 
employment strategies by who does the actual work; direct strategies are accomplished 
by the forces themselves while indirect strategies use “influence on indigenous forces and 
populations” to do the work.18 
The English military historian and theorist Sir B. H. Liddell Hart also divided 
strategies as either direct or indirect.  Through a broad study of military history as an 
editor of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Liddell Hart noticed a recurring trend: 
“[T]hroughout the ages, effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the 
approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent’s unreadiness to meet it.  
The indirectness has usually been physical, and always psychological.  In strategy, the 
longest way round is often the shortest way home.”19  From this core observation, Liddell 
Hart’s triage seems to be based upon enemy expectations.  Although this distinction may 
be very salient for theoretical purposes, it is not very useful for practical study: How can 
enemy expectations be accurately assessed? 
Despite the same terms and many conceptual similarities to other strategists’ 
definitions, the Arreguín-Toft typology has a slightly different view and cuts to the most 
fundamental concept of military strategy.  His typology focuses directly on disabling the 
enemy by one of two distinct ways, whereas the other categorizations approach enemy 
engagement more circuitously.  Arreguín-Toft’s framework for determining strategy is 
the most comprehensive and thereby offers the greatest applicability across time and 
operating environments.   
 
18  David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 153. 
19 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d rev ed. (New York: Praeger, 1967), 25. 
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The choice between strategies is extremely salient—even when opposite 
strategies are able to achieve the same outcomes.  As Colin Gray points out, “different 
means to identical strategic ends may have distinctive consequences.”20  Consider a man 
who requires money to buy a car.  One approach would be to go to the bank and obtain a 
loan.  Another approach would be to rob the bank.  If successful, both approaches achieve 
the same end: the man gets the money to buy a car; however, the follow-on situation 
associated with each approach is drastically different—in both success and failure.   
Strategic interaction is the interplay that results from an attacking military 
choosing either a direct or indirect strategy matched against a defending military that 
chooses either a direct or indirect strategy.  In Arreguín-Toft’s analysis, the cases studied 
were narrowed to include only strong actors attacking weak actors.  He hypothesized and 
supported the theory that symmetric strategic interactions favor strong actors while 
asymmetric strategic interactions favor weak actors.21 
 
 Weak Actor Strategic Approach 

































Figure 1.   Strategic Interaction Typology, from Arreguín-Toft, 2001, p. 108 
 
                                                 
20  Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, Vol. 164 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 150 
(accessed 3/18/2009). 
21  Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International 
Security 26, no. 1 (2001), 93–128. 
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The largest shortcoming of Arreguín-Toft, as well as the rest of the school of 
researchers that view strategy as the most important determinant of war outcomes, is their 
lack of explanatory power in why strong actors select employment methods that are not 
optimal for victory.  Patricia Sullivan has a very succinct critique:  “Although the weak 
may not have the war-fighting capacity to choose an optimal strategic response to their 
adversary’s military strategy, strong states do have that capacity.”22  Some researchers, 
such as Sullivan, view this explanatory weakness as a fundamental flaw of employment 
models because they do not accurately explain behavior; as a result, they begin looking 
for other explanations.  This paper takes a closer look at this phenomenon.  Why do 
strong actors, who are theoretically free to select either strategy, frequently employ a 
strategy that does not result in the optimal strategic interaction? 
This paper enters the fray to build upon the military employment school of 
thought and answer why strong actors employ strategies that are not optimized for 
victory.  Using the Arreguín-Toft framework as a starting point upon which to build, this 
paper first creates a game theoretic model of strategic interactions to show how a non-
optimal strategy can be a rational choice—at least for initial stages of conflict.  However, 
since wars are usually waged over multiple interactions, sub-optimal strategies should not 
be employed beyond initial interactions.  This paper then compiles a group of factors that 
influence an actor selecting between a direct or indirect military strategy.  These factors 
are then used to explain the implementation of a non-optimal strategy.  This paper then 
applies the derived framework to recent U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan to 
examine how well it fits recent empirical data.  Finally, this thesis draws attention to the 
laborious and difficult process of adjusting U.S. strategy and the substantial, sometimes 
irreversible, strategic costs incurred without a deliberate change mechanism to an indirect 
attack strategy.  
 
22  Patricia L. Sullivan, “War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 3 (2007), 497. 
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III. A CLOSER LOOK AT ARREGUÍN-TOFT 
 The history of the last ten years has shown what fatal errors result 
from trying to deal with these problems empirically and by guesswork 
when faced with enemies fully conversant with the rules of the game.  We 
must now learn to use these rules as they do . . . We must master the art of 
indirect strategy. 
— Général d’Armée André Beaufre 
 
Arreguín-Toft offers a unique approach upon which to build.  He proposes the 
idea of strategic interaction as a superior theory to explaining how weak actors win wars 
against stronger opponents.  In order to expand upon Arreguín-Toft’s findings it is useful 
to first review and refine his definitions.  This will help to define the types of conflicts in 
which findings are applicable as well as categorize strategies.   
It should also be noted here that some definitions are by design rather broad since 
the level of analysis is the strategic level of military involvement.  There are many 
different denotations and connotations of the term “strategy.”  As used here, the concept 
of strategy is the way that means are employed to achieve desired ends.  The level of 
strategy discussed here is the national military level, which concerns the approach for 
using the military to obtain political goals.  Strategy is therefore at a lower level than 
grand strategy, which encompasses all instruments of national power, such as diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic instruments.  On the other side, strategy is at a 
higher level than tactics, which refers to the specific techniques and procedures for 
employing military units.23   
It is also beneficial to draw attention to the assumption that there are only two 
strategy choices at this level of strategy.  It is assumed that any option to not participate 
in conflict would be made at a level above that of the military.  Or, poetically summed up 
in the words of Alfred Lord Tennyson, “Theirs not to make reply/Theirs not to reason 
 
23  Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, 99–100. 
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why/Theirs but to do and die.”24 Therefore, once the nation decides upon armed conflict 
as the path of choice, the military will try to select the best path to victory. 
In addition to the assumption that the military will be expected to seek victory 
whenever it is ordered into conflict is the assumption that the military will be expected to 
be able to win across the entire spectrum of warfare.  Militaries can be used to provide 
humanitarian assistance on one end of the spectrum all the way up to total war with 
nuclear weapons on the other end.  Regardless of where along the spectrum the particular 
conflict lies, national leadership expects the military to be victorious. 
Another worthwhile point is that it is usually impossible to completely separate 
direct and indirect strategies; attacking capacity will degrade will and targeting will 
usually reduces capacity.  With very few exceptions, neither one can be completely 
separated from the other.  Much of the distinction between the two strategy types in this 
paper therefore rests on intent.  An example of this entanglement is provided by Marshal 
of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Travers Harris—more commonly referred to as 
“Bomber” Harris.  Harris was a staunch proponent of strategic area bombing of Germany.  
Main targets were those that would affect enemy capacity.  However, high altitude 
bombing was not very precise and the bombs usually missed their targets.  Harris did not 
view those bombs as wasted because even when they missed their intended target they 
produced a desirable result—erosion of enemy will.  Because the lines between direct and 
indirect strategies are not absolutely distinct, nor are the tactics employed by either 
strategy mutually exclusive, the preponderance of available information is enough to 
categorize a strategy.  This simplification of viewing the two strategies as completely 
separate entities is required for theoretical analysis even though it is understood that the 
two strategies cannot be cleanly separated. 
A. STRONG AND WEAK 
There are many different measures for strong and weak.  Arreguín-Toft followed 
a recognized practice of quantifying power using the size of the population and armed 
 
24 Alfred Tennyson Lord, “The Charge of the Light Brigade,” In The Works of Alfred, Lord Tennyson, 




ider the U.S. as the strong attacker and the anti-
government forces the weak defender. 
                                                
forces.  He defined the strong and weak relationship as follows:  “A strong actor is one 
whose material power exceeds that of its adversary or adversaries by at least ten to one.  
Material power is the product of a given state’s population and armed forces.  ‘Strong’ 
and ‘weak’ therefore have meaning only in a particular dyadic context.”25  This paper 
used the same definition of “strong” and “weak” followed by Arreguín-Toft.  In addition, 
it continued with the construct of the strong actor as the attacker.  This assumed 
adversarial position of the strong as the attacker and the weak as the defender was quite 
appropriate based on resources available to the “strong” and “weak” by definition.  Major 
General Svechin bolsters this assumption quite nicely. 
In general, the pursuit of negative goals, that is, fighting for the complete 
or partial maintenance of the status quo, requires less expenditure of forces 
or resources than the pursuit of positive goals, namely fighting for 
conquest and forward movement.  It is easier to keep what you have than 
get something new.  The weaker side will naturally go on the 
Another point worth clarifying here is the supporting relationship often present in 
asymmetrical wars.  For example, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and quickly 
toppled the existing Taliban regime.  The U.S. was then actively involved with standing 
up a new regime in Afghanistan that was indigenous.  Additionally, the U.S. has kept 
troops in Afghanistan to suppress anti-government action and to assist the new regime 
until it is capable of governing without external intervention.  Much of the violence today 
consists of members of the Afghan population attacking the new Afghan government 
personnel and institutions. However, the U.S. has a strong presence in Afghanistan, is 
squarely behind the new Afghan regime, and is actively fighting anti-government forces. 
As such, it is easy to continue to cons
 
25  Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, 94. 
26  Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, ed. Kent D. Lee, trans. Kent D. Lee (Minneapolis, MN: East View 
Publications, 1992. Original work published in 1927), 250.  The relatively recent 9/11 al Qaeda attacks on 
the U.S. could be viewed as an anomaly to this relationship.  However, it is not likely that al Qaeda 
anticipated the resulting actions.  It is more likely that the attack was designed as a forward defense against 
the U.S. 
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The distinction becomes more difficult when an external supporter does not stand 
up a regime nor commit combat troops.   One such instance occurred in the 1980s when 
the U.S. supported the government of El Salvador against the left wing revolutionary 
guerrilla forces of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).  The U.S. 
sent in a team of military advisors to prevent the collapse of the government of El 
Salvador.  After the government was stabilized, U.S. advisors assisted the government of 
El Salvador with military advice on defeating the FMLN as well as political reform to 
decrease the recruiting base from which the anti-government FMLN could draw.  
Although the U.S. was not directly involved in fighting and all actions were ultimately at 
the discretion of the government of El Salvador, this conflict can also be conceptualized 
with the U.S. as the strong attacker engaging the FMLN as the weak defender; the U.S. 
used military resources with the purpose of pursuing U.S. interests.  The only difference 
is the people that were involved in actual combat fighting for those interests were not 
U.S. citizens. 
B. DIRECT ATTACK 
Direct attack is the use of the military to target the enemy’s capacity to wage war.  
Targets of this strategy include enemy armed forces, production factories, defensive 
positions, communications, and other infrastructure.  This includes strategies of attrition 
and maneuver.  The enemy may still have the will to resist, but following a successful 
direct attack strategy, will no longer have the capability to resist. 
C. INDIRECT ATTACK 
Conversely, indirect attack is the targeting of the enemy’s will to wage war.  
Many of the targets of an indirect attack may be the same as those of an indirect attack 
but the difference lies in the means and intentions.  An example of an indirect attack is 
the U.S. firebombing of Japan in 1945.  Although many viable military targets were 
destroyed and the Japanese capacity to wage war was decreased by the death of 900,000 
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Japanese civilians using this tactic, the main target of the widespread destruction was the 
will of the Japanese people to continue the war.27 
Arreguín-Toft strays from an absolute distinction in his definition of indirect 
attack.  He labels indirect attack “barbarism” and says it is the “systematic violation of 
the laws of war in pursuit of a military or political objective.”28  His definition can be 
improved upon in two ways.  First, the “barbarism” definition allows for an attack on 
both will and capacity.  However, using the indirect strategy, enemy will is the primary 
target and any degradation of capacity is secondary.  In application, this difference in 
definition has very little effect other than making it more parsimonious and keeping the 
distinction between the two strategies as clear as possible based upon primary objective.  
It may, however, change the placement category of concentration camp usage, which 
Arreguín-Toft includes in “barbarism” because they are a violation of laws that reduces 
enemy capacity to resist.  Under the starker definition of this paper, concentration camps 
would most likely be labeled as a form of direct attack since they reduce the capacity of 
the enemy to wage war by placing personnel in the camps; but if their use was to erode 
the will of the enemy they would be a form of indirect attack. 
Second, it should be pointed out that the will of the enemy can be attacked using 
means other than coercion.  Cooption is a viable way to destroy enemy will to resist.  
Abraham Lincoln clearly understood this with his quote, “I destroy my enemies when I 
make them my friends.”  The British also demonstrated this understanding with their 
handling of the Malaya emergency; one of the main factors inspiring the population to 
join the insurgency was the desire for independence from British rule.  When the British 
announced that Malaya would receive national independence once the insurgency was 
quelled, the desire for much of the population to revolt against the British fizzled.29   
 
27Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, 129.  
28  Ibid., 101. 
29 Komer, Robert W. with United States Advanced Research Projects Agency, The Malayan 
Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort (Santa Monica, CA: The 
RAND Corporation, 1972). 
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D. DIRECT DEFENSE 
Direct defense refers to the use of military forces to destroy the attacker’s 
capacity to attack.  The ultimate goal of this strategy is to destroy the attacking force so it 
is physically unable to continue the assault.  This can be accomplished by defending 
strategic positions.  Almost counter intuitively, direct defense can also be accomplished 
using preemptive, or even preventive, attacks on enemy forces if the goal is defensive.  
This corollary is captured by the saying that “the best defense is a good offense.”  The 
Israeli attacks during the 1967 Six Day War are a prime example of this defensive 
strategy.  Facing mounting Arab forces on three fronts, the Israelis surprised the 
gathering forces and attacked preemptively.  Although the action was an attack, the 
purpose was defensive in nature, depriving the Arabs of the initiative. 
E. INDIRECT DEFENSE 
Indirect defense is the targeting of the enemy’s will to continue the attack.  Again, 
although many of the targets will be the same as in direct defense, the strategic purpose is 
different.  The goal of an indirect defense is to convince the attacker to stop attacking 
even though he still has the capacity to attack.  The classic indirect defense is a guerrilla 
warfare strategy.  Guerrilla warfare inflicts damage upon the attacker whenever able to 
safely do so and then retreat to sanctuary.  Even though guerrilla warfare decreases the 
capacity of the attacker, this effect is secondary to the impact on enemy will.  Guerrillas 
try to draw the conflict out for as long as possible with the intent of depleting the 
enemy’s will to continue the fight.  Beaufre describes guerrilla warfare, “as old as the 
hills but which each generation has nevertheless forgotten and had to learn afresh.”30  In 
addition to guerrilla warfare, psychological operations fit very well in this category. 
F. SHORTCOMINGS 
A potential problem of the Arreguín-Toft piece is that his quantitative data is 
based on strategic interactions that are viewed independently from previous interactions.  
 
30  Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, with Particular Reference to Problems of Defense, Politics, 
Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age. 
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He analyzed conflicts by reducing them down to a single, characteristic strategic 
interaction and also by looking at progressive strategic interactions that occurred 
throughout the conflict; both approaches supported his hypothesis.  He did not analyze 
the effect that previous strategic interactions had on subsequent ones.  Initial strategic 
interactions could place an actor in an unrecoverable position, making subsequent 
interactions irrelevant.  Clausewitz and others would probably support the notion that 
victories in war are built upon accumulated victories in strategic interactions but this is 
not always the case.  One illustrative example where this was not the case was 
encapsulated in conversation between U.S. Colonel Harry Summers and one of his North 
Vietnamese counterparts, Colonel Tu, after the Vietnam war.  Col Summers boasted, 
“You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield.”  The North Vietnamese officer 
considered this comment and replied, “That may be so.  But it is also irrelevant.”31  
Obviously, Col Tu’s point was that North Vietnamese victory was not built on 
accumulated battlefield victories. 
Another shortcoming may be the fact that the definition of “victory” is not a 
clearly defined, nor mutually agreed upon concept, until the actual termination of war.  
Simply stated, war is an ill-defined problem that cannot be precisely analyzed or solved 
using quantitative analyses. 
 
31 Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio 
Press, 1982), 1. 
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IV. GAME THEORETIC MODEL 
War! that mad game the world so loves to play. 
— Jonathan Swift 
 
The Arreguín-Toft typology is a great beginning for a game theoretic model to 
discover insights into strategy selection for both actors.32  The game theoretic model is in 
no way intended to encompass all of the complexities and nuances that are part of a 
conflict; it is intended to create a heuristic device to capture the predominant strategies of 
each.  The game theoretic model introduced here is useful to analyze strategy choices 
available to both sides and implications that each strategy choice incurs.  Additionally, 
the game-theoretic model does a particularly good job of illustrating a reason why sub-
optimal strategies may be selected.  It also shows the necessity of both strategies to be 
equally viable options and points out keenly the gains that can be made from changing 
strategies. 
In order to build the game theoretic model, it is first necessary to rank order the 
possible outcomes by order of preference to each of the actors.  These preferences are 
based upon two overarching concepts; first is the Arreguín-Toft hypothesis that 
symmetric interactions favor the strong actor while asymmetric interactions favor the 
weak actor.  Second is the realization that the forces and equipment to implement a direct 
strategy are expensive.  Intuitively, it would seem that the order of preferences for the 
weak actor would be the exact opposite of the strong actor’s.  However, this is not the 






32 Game theory was originally introduced by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 as a 
way of using mathematics to capture strategic behavior.  It now is considered an entire branch of applied 
mathematics and has been used extensively in political and social sciences.  For their original work, see 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944). 
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probability of victory over economy.  Conversely, resource-constrained weak actors are 
more likely to employ a strategy due to economic reasons as the primary driver and 
probability of victory second.33   
A. ORDINAL VALUES FOR STRONG ACTORS 
The optimal quadrant for strong actors is a direct attack against a direct defense.  
This outcome maximizes the inherent advantages of the strong attacker while minimizing 
those of the weak defender.  Most strong militaries are organized to effectively counter 
other strong militaries that are built along similar lines for similar purposes using similar 
philosophies.  This is what van Creveld calls “mirror-imaging” and is a very common 
phenomenon amongst opponent dyads.34  Therefore, when a weak actor tries to defend 
against a strong actor using the same strategy, the results should favor the strong actor as 
a result of the military strength the attacker can bring to bear.  There are many conflicts 
that fit this interaction; a prime example is the U.S. actions in Kuwait and Iraq during the 
first Gulf War.  The Iraqi forces defended with a direct strategy while the U.S. used a 
direct attack.  The result favored the U.S. to a degree that astonished the world and even 
the U.S. military: U.S. casualties were unprecedentedly low.35 
The next best outcome for strong actors is indirect attack against indirect defense.  
This is because of the relatively low costs required to carry out this type of strategy while 
still maintaining a favorable probability of victory.  Some examples of this interaction 
include the successful British suppression of the Malaya emergency and U.S. assistance 
to the El Salvador government during the El Salvador Civil War from 1980–1992. 
 
33 The game theory model introduced in this paper does not go beyond ordinal values—that is rank 
ordering of strategic interactions.  In game theory, it is common to apply cardinal values to outcomes as 
well.  Cardinal values represent utility values and allow for optimal combinations of possible strategies to 
achieve a maximized outcome.  However, it would be extremely difficult to assign meaningful utility 
values to any strategic interaction outcome.  Additionally, since both direct and indirect strategies available 
to each actor already contain inseparable combinations of targeting enemy capacity and will, any 
computations derived from cardinal values would be essentially meaningless. 
34  Van Creveld, The Transformation of War. 
35 Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, 133. 
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The second worst outcome results from a direct attack against an indirect defense.  
Arreguín-Toft showed that this interaction favored the weak actor but it is still possible 
for the strong actor to emerge victorious.  Classic examples of this strategic interaction 
are the USSR in Afghanistan and the U.S. in Vietnam.   
The absolute worst strategic interaction for strong attackers is indirect attack 
against direct defense.  This interaction sidelines the strength advantage of the strong 
attacker and does little, if anything, to reduce the advantages of the defender.  It is like 
bringing a knife to a gunfight.  Defeat in these situations can be disastrous and 
embarrassing.  A representative example is the U.S. plan to infiltrate Cuba that resulted in 
















Rank Best Next Best Next Worst Worst 
Ordinal Value 4 3 2 1 
Table 1.   Summary of Ordinal Values for Strong Actors. 
B. ORDINAL VALUES FOR WEAK ACTORS 
The best outcome weak actors could achieve would result from a direct attack 
against an indirect defense because this is an inexpensive strategy that gives the defender 
the higher probability of victory.  This interaction maximizes the advantages of the 
defender and exploits the weaknesses of the attacker.  With resource requirements kept 
low, the defender is able to prolong the engagement with the goal of drawing out the 
conflict for a length of time that is unacceptable to the attacker.  This strategic interaction 
pairing proved effective for the mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan and the 
Vietcong guerrillas against the U.S. in Vietnam. 
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The second most desirable interaction for the weak actor is an indirect attack 
against an indirect defense.  Although the weak actor still has the lower win percentage, 
this interaction still keeps resource requirements low and has a possibility of victory.  
Since it seems most strong attackers are more prone to favor a direct attack than indirect 
attack, the defender may be able to capitalize on errors made by an attacker not 
completely adept in this strategy. 
The second worst strategic interaction for the defender is the indirect attack 
against direct defense.  To begin with, the defender will spend a lot of resources for a 
force capable of direct attack.  The quantity and quality of direct action forces are not 
likely to be up to the same level as those of the strong attacker.  Therefore, a victory for 
the defender in this strategic interaction is likely to be fleeting.  The strong actor will 
likely attack again with a larger force using a direct attack, which will have a marked 
advantage over the weak actor direct defense forces. 
The last interaction, direct attack against direct defense, is the least desirable for 
the weak actor.  This interaction does not capitalize on any of the advantages the weak 
enjoy and allows the strong to leverage their advantages.  It is expensive for the weak 
actor to resort to a direct defense, which will then compete in a strategic interaction 
pairing as the underdog.  The weak actor competes head-on with a larger, more advanced, 
and better-trained force.  This interaction provides the worst possible outcome for the 
weak actors.  As pointed out earlier from the perspective of the strong actor, the first Gulf 
War was a recent example of this pairing.  Saddam attempted to confront the U.S. 
attackers by playing the same type of game as the U.S.  The Iraqi conventional troops and 


















Rank Best Next Best Next Worst Worst 
Ordinal Value 4 3 2 1 
Table 2.   Summary of Ordinal Values for Weak Actors. 
C. THE RESULTING GAME 
Combining the ordinal value preferences of both actors together in a two-by-two 
matrix yields a simple game theoretic model that can be used for insight into strategy 
options.  In this model, each actor tries to maximize their value of strategic interaction 
outcomes.  The goal of this model is to determine optimal strategies for both the strong 
and weak actors.  The game theoretic model retains the basic character of the original 
Arreguín-Toft typology: symmetric interactions tend to favor the strong actors while 
asymmetric interactions favor the weak.36 
 
  Weak Actor 
  Direct Defense Indirect Defense 
Direct Attack (4, 1) (2,4) 
Strong Actor 
Indirect Attack (1,2) (3,3) 
Figure 2.   Game Theoretic Model of Strategic Interaction. 
                                                 
36 This game is analyzed as a static game in which both actors simultaneously select their strategy 
without any communication with the other actor.  Future research using more advanced formal models of 
game theory may provide additional insight; however, the static game theory model provided here achieves 
the purpose of providing an adequate heuristic for available strategy choices and provides insight into how 
actors should be expected to behave over time. 
Using this model, the first question is: What is the optimal strategy for the weak 
actor?  The result shows a weak actor has a strictly dominant strategy of indirect defense.  
This means that no matter which strategy the strong actor attacks with, the defender 
achieves a more desirable strategic interaction by employing an indirect defense.  There 
is never a situation where the weak actor could achieve a more desirable strategic 
interaction by using a direct defense. 
 
  Weak Actor 
  Direct Defense Indirect Defense 
Direct Attack (4, 1) (2,4) 
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Strong Actor 
Indirect Attack (1,2) (3,3) 
 
 Risk low of 1 Risk low of 3 
Figure 3.   Optimal Strategy for Weak Actor. 
The next question is: What is the optimal strategy for the strong actor?  This 
question is a little more complicated than it was for the weak actor because there is not a 
dominant strategy.  Two possible solutions are found using the “maximin” approach and 
the Nash Equilibrium. 
The first possible solution for an optimal strong actor strategy can be found by 
conceptualizing a conflict as a single iteration match between attacker and defender.  
When viewed in this manner, a strong actor may decide to employ a conservative 
strategy—meaning more concerned with minimizing “worst case” possibilities than 
maximizing best or most likely case scenarios.  This is called the “maximin” strategy. 
With this approach, a strong actor may opt for a direct attack strategy because the lowest 
possible result is more preferable than that of an indirect attack strategy.  This is an  
 
extremely conservative approach for the strong actor since the weak actor has a dominant 
strategy of indirect defense; however, it does preclude the strong actor from ending up 
with his worst possible outcome. 
 
  Weak Actor 
  Direct Defense Indirect Defense 
Direct Attack (4, 1) (2,4) 
Strong Actor 
Indirect Attack (1,2) (3,3) 
Risk low of 2
Risk low of 1
Figure 4.   Conservative Strategy for Strong Actor. 
When the strong actor conservative strategy of direct attack is combined with the 
weak actor dominant strategy of indirect defense, the result is an asymmetric strategic 
interaction that therefore favors the weak actor. 
 
  Weak Actor 
  Direct Defense Indirect Defense 
Direct Attack (4, 1) (2,4) 
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Strong Actor 
Indirect Attack (1,2) (3,3) 
Risk low of 2 
Risk low of 1 
Figure 5.   Resulting Game with Conservative Strategy. 
The strategic interaction that results from a direct attack is not optimal for the 
strong actor; however, it is still a completely rational and justifiable strategy choice if the 
strong actor approaches the conflict conservatively and views the interaction as a single 
iteration.  This outcome is only likely if viewing war as a single iteration of the game 
since the strong actor can unilaterally achieve a more desirable outcome by switching to 
an indirect attack strategy.   
The Nash Equilibrium is another solution concept that can be applied as a 
probable outcome of this game.  A Nash Equilibrium is an outcome that is considered 
stable because no player can improve his or her outcome by a unilateral change of 
strategy. 37  This game has one pure strategy Nash Equilibrium located at {indirect 
attack, indirect defense}.  It is easy to justify the Nash Equilibrium as a likely outcome to 
this game due to the strictly dominant strategy of the weak actor, which is indirect 
defense.  Since the strong actor knows that a rational weak actor should never select a 
direct defense strategy, the strong actor should simply select his most preferable outcome 
against the weak actor indirect defense—which is indirect attack. 
 
  Weak Actor 
  Direct Defense Indirect Defense 
Direct Attack (4, 1) (2,4) 
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Strong Actor 
Indirect Attack (1,2) (3,3) 
 
Figure 6.   Resulting Game with Nash Equilibrium. 
D. PREDICTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS FROM THE GAME 
From the game, it can be expected that weak actors would prefer indirect defense 
over direct defense.  More interestingly, strong actors can justify either a direct or indirect 
attack strategy for early strategic interactions depending upon whether they prefer to 
minimize risk or maximize gain.  Regardless of initial strategies, though, in prolonged 
conflicts it would be expected that strong actors would adjust strategy to maximize 
probability of victory.  The failure of strong actors to select “optimal” strategies is the 
reason many dismiss the employment school of thought for predicting war outcomes.  
However, this dismissal overlooks the possibility that strategy selection may be driven by 
more than just probability of victory. 
                                                 
37 John Nash, “Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 36, no. 2 (1950), 48–49. 
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V. STRATEGY DRIVERS 
I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have 
controlled me. 
— Abraham Lincoln 
 
There is a very interesting phenomenon associated with strategy selection.  
Although it should theoretically be the probability of victory that most influences strong 
actors to adopt a strategy, this does not usually appear to be the case.  Hy Rothstein’s 
Less is More article draws attention to instances in which the U.S. was successful only 
because limits were placed on the U.S. as a strong attacker that necessitated an indirect 
approach.38  Likewise, British actions in the Malaya Emergency highlight this 
phenomenon very well.  The British were having a terrible time attempting to put down 
the predominantly Chinese insurgency using a conventional, direct approach.  Because of 
financial straits back in England, the British did not have the option to increase troop 
strengths to counteract the insurgency.  As a result, they switched to an indirect attack 
strategy.  Through active efforts combined with a small troop presence, the British were 
able to wage a successful counterinsurgency campaign.39  These examples point out that 
some strong militaries may have a propensity for direct attack that can only be overcome 
when other factors prevent a direct strategy.  As a result, the indirect strategy is selected 
by necessity instead of for its utility.  Therefore, strategy selection is likely based on 
more than just probability of victory.  This section constructs a theory of factors that go 
into a military’s pursuit of an either direct or indirect strategy.  These factors can be 
conceptualized almost as constraints that influence strategy selection.   
The game theoretic model showed that strategy selection should be influenced by 
the probability of victory.  In addition to this factor, Beaufre argued that the choice 
 
38  Hy S. Rothstein, “Less is More: The Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an Era of 
Collapsing States,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007), 275–294. 
39  Komer, Robert W. with United States Advanced Research Projects Agency, The Malayan 
Emergency in Retrospect; Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort (Santa Monica, CA: 
Rand, 1972). 
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between direct and indirect strategy is a function of a case-specific factor, force size, 
psychological effect, and time.40  Hy Rothstein distilled Beaufre’s concepts into 1) 
Freedom of action, 2) Resources available to the military, and 3) Importance of what is at 
stake.41  Furthermore, any strategic decision will likely be influenced by time available 
and an expectation of victory.  Therefore, this study finds the following factors as driving 
forces in strategy employment: 
S = f (p * k * F * T * I * R * E)42 
where:  
 S = strategy choice of either direct or indirect 
 p = probability of victory 
k = institutional predisposition 
 F = freedom of action 
 T = time 
 I = importance of stake 
 R = resources available to military 
 E = expectation of victory 
 
The manner in which all of these factors are combined and weighted is unique to 
each military.  Many authors have looked at the different characteristics of war that have 
emerged from the manner in which the U.S. has combined these various elements.  Thus, 
the American way of war has a particular character.  Russell Weigley’s book, The 
American Way of War, basically described the evolving changes in American military 
strategy since the formation of the country.  Although he touched on many different 
factors that led to strategy implementation, his belief seemed to be that the American way 
of war is based predominantly on plentiful resources.43  Other authors, reaching all the 
 
40  Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, with Particular Reference to Problems of Defense, Politics, 
Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age, 129. 
41 History of Special Operations lecture, January 27th, 2009. 
42 This equation is for heuristic purposes only; it is not intended to mathematically explore the 
potential interactions between all of the factors that drive strategy.  Rather, the equation is intended to 
provide a condensed list of factors that this paper views as drivers that affect strategy in warfare. 
43  Russell Frank Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy 
and Policy, Indiana University Press paperback ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977). 
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way back to Thucydides, have examined how other countries have unique styles that 
result from their combinations of these variables as well.   
A. DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS THAT DRIVE STRATEGY 
The indirect and direct approaches to strategy have already been discussed.  Now 
we will turn to the factors that influence strategy.  It should be noted that none of the 
factors are completely independent; changing one will undoubtedly influence variation in 
at least one of the others.  In the paragraphs that follow, this paper attempted to examine 
the effects of holding all other factors constant while changing only one term at a time in 
order to examine the influence on strategy choice. 
The first factor to discuss is the probability of victory from the Arreguín-Toft 
research.  Ideally, this factor should be the principle focus—at least for strong actors 
since they should theoretically have more latitude in strategy implementation.  The 
probability of victory does not appear to favor either a direct or indirect strategy since it 
is an interactive element that depends on the strategy selected by the opponent.   
The “k” factor, which is here labeled as institutional predisposition, was a very 
astute observation of Beaufre.44  It is treated almost as a “parameter”; it can change, but 
at any given time it has a fixed value.  Although the definition presented here is slightly 
different from the one Beaufre had in mind, the concept comes from his writings.  All 
things being equal, every organization has a tendency to select one type of strategy over 
the other.  Arreguín-Toft also recognized this predisposition when he observed that 
strong actors are not completely free to select any strategy for a given conflict.  This 
inflexibility is based on certain characteristics of the military, which are determined by 
the culture and history of the society as well as the traditions, training, organization, and 
equipment of the military designed to meet a prioritized threat.45  All of these factors will 
feed into an institutional predisposition.   
 
44  Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, with Particular Reference to Problems of Defense, Politics, 
Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age. 
45  Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, 106–107. 
 28
                                                
Which direction the institutional predisposition favors will largely be influenced 
by threat analyses.  Military organizations are based largely on the goal of countering 
perceived threats—both actual current threats as well as predicted future threats.  
Compounding the difficulty of these analyses is the fact that worst-case and most-likely 
threats may have completely different natures—such as nuclear war and guerrilla 
warfare.  From these threat analyses and a logical methodology, a military is organized 
and equipped to effectively counter a certain threat.  However, a military organized to be 
the perfect counter to one threat will not be ideally suited to another type of threat.  In 
fact, in preparing for one type of threat, a military may be least prepared for another type.  
As a result, there may be some sections of the military that will be more suited to 
counteract the threats that the bulk of the force is unprepared for, but these are hedge bets 
and still largely subordinate to the main force; the bulk of the military is organized for 
one particular threat type.  This organizational factor alone may lead a military to fight 
wars in a manner for which they are more prepared—regardless of the actual threat. 
The U.S. military gives a great illustration of this organizational phenomenon.  As 
the global hegemon with interests in every corner of the world, the U.S. military prepares 
for responses ranging on the peaceful end from humanitarian assistance all to way on the 
destructive end to nuclear annihilation without omitting anything in between.  Whenever 
feasible, the military tries to apply a single weapon system to counter as many threats as 
possible.  Immediately following WWII, the U.S. thought a robust nuclear arsenal would 
be able to respond to any threat along the continuum, a doctrine labeled Massive 
Retaliation.  As the flaws of that assumption became more visible and the credibility of 
using nuclear weapons for conflicts along the entire spectrum of conflict diminished, 
President Kennedy ushered in the era of Flexible Response.  The logic behind this 
doctrine was that the U.S. needed to be more adept at war short of nuclear war—
especially guerrilla warfare.  However, it was still believed, in the words of Army Chief 
of Staff General George Decker, that “Any good soldier can handle guerrillas.”46  As a 
result, the bulk of the military was organized to effectively combat the nuclear and 
 
46 Quoted in Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), 37. 
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conventional communist threats with the belief that this would also be effective against a 
guerrilla-based insurgency.  Only small pockets of the military, such as Special Forces, 
were on hand specifically for guerrilla-type enemies but they were the exception and not 
the rule.  When the U.S. increased involvement in Vietnam, it was not well prepared to 
counter the guerrilla-styled Vietcong in southern Vietnam.  Luttwak sharply scolded the 
U.S. Army for having an institutional predisposition clearly favoring a direct strategy by 
saying the Army “subordinates the sharp choices which strategy unfailingly requires to 
the convenience of bureaucratic harmony.”47  The resulting strategy in Vietnam was then 
more “suited for a landing and front-opening campaign on the scale of Normandy in June 
1944” than for what was required in Vietnam and thus “dysfunctional.”48 
Another interesting organizational aspect of the institutional predisposition is the 
mirror-imaging effect, or “exogenous change” as Luttwak referred to it.49  Martin van 
Creveld attributed this phenomenon to the “the paradoxical logic of strategy.”50  He set 
up the concept well:  
In ordinary life, an action that has succeeded once can be expected to 
succeed twice—provided circumstances remain the same.  If I drop an 
object once and find that it hits the ground after such and such a time, I 
can reasonably expect the same thing to happen again, however often the 
action is repeated.  But this elementary fact—on which are based the 
whole of science and technology—does not apply to war, football, chess, 
or any other activity that is governed by strategy.  Here, an action that has 
succeeded once will likely fail when it is tried for the second time.  It will 
fail, not in spite of having succeeded once but because its very success 
will probably put an intelligent opponent on his guard.  The same 
reasoning also works in reverse.  An operation having failed once, the 






47  Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Parameters 13, no. 4 (1983), 12. 
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will not be repeated, the best way to ensure success is precisely to repeat 
it.  A continuous dynamic interaction ensues, capable of turning victory 
into disaster and disaster into victory.51 
Van Creveld used this backdrop to argue that the very act of deducing the 
opponent’s strategy while concealing your own in order to employ the most effective 
counterstrategy inevitably leads to adapting reciprocally to a form that more closely 
resembles the enemy.  Given enough iterations, both opponents will end up at the same 
solution as the best combination to defeat one another.52  This mirror imaging negates the 
advantage one side may exploit by using a different strategy, tactic, or organizational 
method. 
In addition to organization, cultural factors may preclude the use of one type of 
strategy.  General Robert E. Lee provided a very clear example of this cultural disdain 
during the Civil War when he referred to guerrilla warfare as an “unmixed evil” and thus 
viewed it as an unacceptable way of war.53  As a result, the overwhelming majority of the 
Confederate Army completely disregarded the potential benefits of an indirect strategy.  
The result was a direct strategy that failed to capitalize on many advantages of the 
Confederacy that could have been leveraged with an indirect strategy.  Unfortunately, it 
is not usually so easy to identify cultural aversions to a particular strategy.  It is possible, 
however, that it may be gauged by doctrine, practiced tactics, and training. 
Although the institutional predisposition can theoretically favor either direct or 
indirect strategies, it appears that most national militaries are presently organized to 
engage in warfare using direct strategies against other national militaries. 
Freedom of action was one of the principles of war analyzed by Foch and became 
a cornerstone concept of Beaufre’s thoughts on strategy.  Although Beaufre usually 
discussed freedom of action in terms of room left for military action without fear of 
nuclear annihilation, the concept can be applied to other delimiters as well.  One is to 
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conduct war in a manner that precludes unwanted escalation or the involvement of 
additional parties.  Additionally, while Beaufre looked exclusively at external limits on 
freedom of action, this study incorporates internal limits as well.  Russian strategist 
General Aleksandr Svechin expressed his agreement with the importance of these 
internal, domestic factors in waging war when he described war as “a very serious test of 
the health of domestic politics.”54 
One very important internal dimension of freedom of action is domestic tolerance.  
For example, the crux of Gil Merom’s argument in How Democracies Lose Small Wars is 
that they “find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that 
which can secure victory” because they are restricted by their “domestic structure” and 
“institutional makeup.”55  Thus, it is the restricted freedom of action, in Merom’s mind, 
which is the “unambiguous” reason democracies lose small wars.56  By this logic, 
democracies may be able to support a direct strategy with a high degree of freedom of 
action through widespread public support by minimizing the time of the conflict, 
demonstrating a vital interest, or by keeping real and perceived costs low.  If these 
options to increase the freedom of action are not available, an indirect strategy that 
minimizes exposure of efforts is much more likely to be effective. 
Freedom of action does not seem to consistently favor either type of strategy.  It 
could be argued that a wide-open freedom of action allows for the application of more 
troops and thus a more direct strategy.  On the other side of the coin, though, it appears 
the international opinion against the Axis powers in WWII allowed the U.S. to break the 
will of the Japanese using an indirect strategy with the atom bomb. 
The factor of time is quite important in the strategy algorithm.  Shorter conflict 
durations are more often associated with a direct strategy while indirect strategies are 
more often with prolonged conflicts.  The importance of time can be critical when 
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coupled with shortcomings in other variables or merely a nicety if other variables are 
strong.  However, because of the interaction with all of the other variables, normal 
relationships and shortcomings can be overcome.  For example, the importance of 
freedom of action and relative stake may be marginalized if the time an operation 
requires is very short.  These adjustments will require more resources in order to 
overcome time limits, though.  On the other hand, if there are no time pressures then 
resources can be kept low with freedom of action, vital interests, or high expectations of 
victory. 
Importance of stake captures many of the non-material factors that are carried into 
battle.  These aspects are what the relative interest school views as determining factors in 
predicting war outcomes.  Interest, resolve, and moral legitimacy should all be considered 
aspects of the stake variable.  These factors have long been considered essential to the art 
of war.  Napoleon gave them a three to one advantage over physical power.57  His 
opinion was bolstered by another French general, General Foch, who noted in WWI, 
“The present-day army is therefore bigger and better trained, but it is also more nervous 
and more easily affected.  The human side of the problem which already had a greater 
importance than the material factor at the beginning of the 19th century must now be 
more important still.”58  General Foch’s observation is no less pertinent today than it was 
when he wrote it.  The importance of stake is intended to incorporate all of the 
psychological factors to which General Foch refers.     
As a rule, larger stakes do not appear to be associated with either strategy.  
Although, for strong actors, there does appear to be a correlation between larger stakes, 
or what the Weinberger doctrine terms “vital interests,” and a direct strategy.  More 
peripheral interests are usually associated with the indirect strategy.  This relationship 
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yet often employ an indirect strategy.  For example, the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, 
fighting for at least independence from the Soviets if not for survival, resorted to an 
indirect strategy.   
Resources available to the military is the factor that the “preponderance of force” 
school of thought views as the best predictor of victory.  Military resources are factors 
that directly allow the application of power.  This variable includes people, with their 
associated skills and training, as well as equipment and financing.  In order to account for 
Joseph Stalin’s maxim, “Quantity has a quality all its own,” this definition is basically 
quantity corrected for quality.  This view of resources subsumes the standard 
“preponderance of force” school of thought as well as the technological and training 
arguments advocated by authors such as Stephen Biddle.  Economic health of a nation 
will greatly affect the quantity and quality of military resources that can be provided for a 
fight—so there will be a correlation of economic health to military resources, but the 
operative factor in contributing to war outcomes directly is military resources.  Holding 
all other factors constant, an abundance of resources appears to be more likely associated 
with a direct strategy while limited resources will likely be associated with an indirect 
strategy. 
Some authors, such as Jeffrey Record, attribute external assistance as a critical 
component of successful insurgencies.59  This paper does not dispute the importance of 
external assistance; however, that assistance must be employed using either a direct or 
indirect strategy.  Therefore, external assistance is another source of resources available 
to the military that must be employed in a manner consistent with an overall strategy.  
From this perspective, external assistance does not constitute an additional strategy 
driver. 
The expectation of victory must also be taken into account for strategy selection.    
The largest variance in strategy due to expectation of victory stems from what “victory” 
looks like for each side of the conflict.  For the strong actor to achieve true victory, he 
must thoroughly defeat the weak.  For the weak actor to achieve victory, he merely needs 
 
59 Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win, 23–66. 
to not lose and hold out until the aggressor is exhausted.  From the lopsided definitions of 
victory stems a tendency for the strong attacker to use a direct attack while the weak 
defender maintains the survivability of his forces using an indirect defense.   
Once any strategy has been implemented, the expectation of victory plays a large 
role in decisions to continue with the initial strategy or to exchange it for the opposite 
one.  Lower expectations of victory should lead to higher probabilities of strategy change.  
This phenomenon is addressed in detail throughout Gartner’s Strategic Assessment in 
War.60 
B. RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF STRATEGY FACTORS 
In this study, the two factors viewed as the most important in determining strategy 
are the probability of victory and the institutional predisposition.  The probability of 
victory is important because it ultimately what each actor attempts to maximize in any 
given conflict.  The institutional predisposition is important for a couple of reasons.  The 
first reason is that it can be directly and deliberately controlled whereas many constraints 
on F, T, I, R, and E may be out of the hands of the military.  As a result, they will 
probably only be able to be altered at the margin, so should be viewed more as 
parameters than as variables.  Additionally, the institutional predisposition will have a 
more consistent effect across conflicts than any of the other factors, which will vary in 
each conflict due to the surrounding issues of each unique conflict. 
 
S = f (p * k * F * T * I * R * E) 
Largely case-dependent Desired goal 




Figure 7.   Relative Importance of Strategy Factors. 
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60 Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War. 
As such, a theoretically ideal institutional predisposition should favor neither a 
direct nor an indirect strategy.  However, as previously discussed, by preparing the 
military to be ideally suited for a particular threat it may be ill suited to meet a different 
threat.  Therefore, an institutional predisposition that favors one type of strategy in order 
to prepare for “worst case” or “most likely” threat scenarios may be acceptable as long as 
the favoring is not to the extent that it precludes the opposite strategy when appropriate. 
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VI. AFGHANISTAN CASE STUDY 
What’s the use of running if you are not on the right road? 
— German proverb 
 
The U.S. involvement in Afghanistan throughout Operation ENDURING 
FREEDOM (OEF) is an important case to study asymmetric warfare for at least two 
reasons.  First, the case is a classically representative instance of asymmetric warfare.   
This paper used the same criteria to assess strong and weak actors that Arreguín-Toft 
used.61  By this formula, the U.S. dominated Afghanistan by a margin of over 640 to 1—
far exceeding the established criteria of 5 to 1.62  Additionally consistent with the 
Arreguín-Toft data set, the strong actor was the attacker and the weak actor the defender.  
The U.S. attacked the Taliban regime and the al Qaeda members they harbored with the 
goal of establishing a more U.S.-friendly government that would not provide terrorists a 
sanctuary.   
The other reason OEF is such an important case study is because the conflict 
continues to this day.  Not only has the war continued for over seven years, but the U.S. 
has recently increased commitment to Afghanistan by adding an additional 17,000 troops 
to the existing 47,000 allied forces already in country.63 
 
61 Arreguín-Toft used a commonly accepted, yet recognized imperfect, estimate of military strength to 
show asymmetry.  A conflict was considered asymmetric if “the halved product of one actor’s armed forces 
and population exceeded the simple product of its adversary’s armed forces and population by > 5:1.”  
Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, 110. 
62This ratio had to be estimated because Afghanistan had no official military in 2001.  Since a Taliban 
force of approximately 50,000 controlled most of the country, that figure was used as the Afghanistan 
military strength.  Although not exact, the differences are disparate enough to negate any errors of 
estimation.    The Military Balance 2001–2002, ed. Christopher Langton (London: Oxford University Press 
for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), 160.  In fact, even if using the entire 
Afghanistan population fit for military service, the U.S. strength still overshadowed Afghanistan by almost 
9 to 1. The World Factbook 2001 (Washington, DC: The Central Intelligence Agency, 2001), 3.  As stated 
previously, measuring power using only sizes of populations and militaries is not a perfect measure of 
power, however, these figures still reflect the asymmetric amount of force the U.S. was able to bring to 
bear against the Taliban and al Qaeda, even when the U.S. had relatively few personnel in Afghanistan. 
63 Jack Kelly, “Obama’s Vietnam? Pouring More Troops into Afghanistan Isn’t Going to Help,” 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, sec. Editorial, H. 3, February 1, 2009. 
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Overall, the initial strategy of the U.S. was one of direct attack.  This worked very 
well for the U.S. because the Taliban and al Qaeda forces met the attacking forces head 
on with a direct defense strategy.  When the Taliban and al Qaeda forces discovered they 
were not going to be able to win using this strategy, they headed for the hills of Tora 
Bora and across the border into Pakistan.  From the relative safety of Pakistan, the 
remnants of the Taliban forces were able to build an insurgency within Afghanistan, a 
classic indirect defense strategy.  The U.S. has continued a predominantly direct attack 
strategy against the indirect defense.  Even when the need for an indirect attack strategy 
was recognized and attempted, the preponderance of the actions indicate that a direct 
attack strategy was still employed. 
A. STRATEGIC INTERACTION #1 
As soon as the American public learned about the Islamist perpetrators of the 9/11 
terrorist acts, the majority of the public wanted military action against the Afghan 
government that harbored them.64  The perils of fighting a campaign in this area were 
well known.  Many experts advised decision makers to look at the Soviet defeat of the 
1980s and the failure of the British to control this region a century earlier to see clearly 
the complications that could come with a large military response.  Afghanistan expert 
Barnett Rubin wrote in the New York Times, “Historically, those who have invaded 
Afghanistan have met ignominious ends.  Mr. bin Laden and his allies may hope that they 
can draw the United States into the same trap that devoured the Soviet Union.  If we lash 
out militarily without a political plan for Afghanistan, they could achieve this.”65  Rubin 
feared a large-scale military response was the goal of the al Qaeda 9/11 attacks in order to 
draw the U.S. into a war that would economically bleed the U.S. dry.   
Taking note of the warnings, the U.S. decided to begin a military campaign to 
replace the Taliban government.  The U.S. did pay at least partial heed to the risks of 
invading Afghanistan by trimming down the size of the occupational force.  One of the 
 
64 Amy Pagnozzi, “War Feels Like a Good Idea, But Wait. Please Wait.” Hartford Courant, sec. 
Northeast, September 23, 2001 (accessed May 21, 2009). 
65 Barnett R. Rubin, “Afghans can be our Allies,” The New York Times, September 22, 2001 (accessed 
May 22, 2009). 
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“lessons” from the Soviet failure in Afghanistan was that the Afghans would resist a large 
military force.66  General Franks, who was the main author of the U.S. operational 
concept, argued that after major combat operations were complete, “our footprint had to 
be small, for both military and geopolitical reasons.  I envisioned a total of about 10,000 
American soldiers, airmen, special operators, and helicopter assault crews, along with 
robust in-country close air support.”67  This understanding, coupled with Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s recent “Revolution of Military Affairs” (RMA), which 
decreased troop levels while leveraging advanced technology, led to an incomplete U.S. 
operational concept for Afghanistan.   
Despite conceptual flaws, after the military operational concept was crafted, the 
next step was implementing the plan.  To meet public expectations of timely redress, the 
armed response was required to begin quickly.  However, the problem with initiating war 
in a very short time period was that the U.S. had virtually zero military presence in 
Afghanistan.  This shortcoming was exacerbated by the geography of Afghanistan as a 
landlocked country.  These conditions required military forces and materiel to be either 
airlifted into country or transported over long land routes.  The solution to opening up 
Afghanistan for the proposed 10,000 troops given these constraints was quite clever; the 
U.S. infiltrated Afghanistan covertly to lead indigenous anti-Taliban and al Qaeda groups 
while leveraging U.S. air power, a solution that was consistent with the RMA conception 
of war. 
The first U.S. ground force to enter Afghanistan was code-named “Jawbreaker.”  
Jawbreaker was a group of eight covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary 
operatives that flew into country aboard a Russian-built Mi-17 helicopter.68  Their 
mission was to analyze the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and shore up support 
for the upcoming military forces by distributing substantial financial support to the anti-
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Taliban forces.69  They made contact with leaders of what would come to be known as 
the Northern Alliance, a “confederation of tribal, religious, and other groups, many of 
which organized to fight the Soviet invasion in the 1980s.”70   
Following Jawbreaker, the opening salvos of U.S. Operation ENDURING 
FREEDOM took place on October 6, 2001, with aircraft from the U.S. and coalition 
countries neutralizing the Taliban’s anti-aircraft defenses of missiles and fighter aircraft 
within two weeks.71 
With the air relatively secure, the ground was next.  U.S. Special Forces from 5th 
Special Forces Group (SFG) were airlifted into Afghanistan on October 19, 2001, from 
Uzbekistan.72  Their objective was to capture Kabul by any means available.73  These 
individuals were able to join forces with the CIA Jawbreaker teams and leaders of the 
Northern Alliance.  Although the Northern Alliance was not overwhelmingly strong, 
controlling only 5% of Afghanistan with approximately 10,000 fighters, they were well 
seasoned; they had plenty of experience from fighting the Soviet invasion as well as an 
armed resistance to the Taliban.74  The Special Forces members put their specialized 
skills in raising, training, and advising indigenous forces to fast use with their Northern 
Alliance allies and quickly moved to capture the cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Kondoz, and 
Kabul. 
Other than the obviously direct strategy of aerial bombardment, many people 
perceive these early operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda as a demonstration of an 
indirect strategy.  That categorization of strategy is correct if it is based on a definition of 
“indirect” similar to that presented by Tucker and Lamb.  To recount, Tucker and Lamb 
argued indirect strategies use “influence on indigenous forces and populations” to do the 
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actual fighting.75  This is the “by, with, and through” philosophy commonly advocated 
by Special Forces.  With approximately 10,000 Afghans and initially less than 100 
American soldiers on the ground engaged in combat, the indigenous population was 
clearly the bulk of the fighters involved in waging war on al Qaeda and the Taliban.76  
However, regardless of the U.S. leveraging indigenous forces, by the Arreguín-Toft 
definitions of strategy, the actions taken by those forces were almost exclusively direct 
attack.  That is, the strategy was to destroy the capacity of the Taliban to remain in 
control of Afghanistan and to either capture or kill th
As long as the Taliban and al Qaeda forces possessed the means to wage a 
conventional war, this strategy made sense for the U.S.  The Taliban reacted with a direct 
defense strategy and was quickly routed.  Stephen Biddle described the outcome of this 
strategic interaction succinctly; “The result was a slaughter.”77  One illustrative battle in 
this strategic interaction phase occurred on the push towards Kabul at Bagram airfield.  
Bagram is about 35 miles outside of Kabul.  It was built as the initial staging area for the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and was a key logistical base throughout that conflict.  It 
was here that members of 5th SFG and their Northern Alliance partners confronted an 
estimated 7,000 Taliban soldiers armed with Soviet-era tanks and artillery.  For two days, 
the Special Forces directed Air Force aircraft and bombs onto the Taliban troops.  After 
that, those that were left alive scattered and the airbase was cleared.78  
From Bagram, the U.S. and Northern Alliance forces continued their drive to 
Kabul.  By November 13, the Taliban had been forced from the capital.  By the end of 
2001, other Special Forces teams, coupled with Rangers, Navy SEALs, CIA operatives, 
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coalition Special Forces, and their indigenous militias, had routed the Taliban from 
strongholds in the cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Kondoz, and Kandahar.   
As the Taliban fled Kabul, they headed towards Pakistan through the Spin Ghar 
mountain range near Tora Bora.79  This region was a refuge for the mujahedeen fighters 
against the Soviets.  The many caves, jagged terrain, and harsh climate offered the 
mujahedeen a safe place to hide and regroup from the Soviets.80  Although this region was 
not an impenetrable fortress that the American forces could not enter, it did slow them down 
considerably and diminished some of the advantages of airpower and reconnaissance.  The 
caves, which offered shelter from the allied bombs, had to be searched one by one.  It is 
commonly believed that this Taliban tactic was successful enough to allow many Taliban 
fighters, including Osama bin Laden, to escape to Pakistan.81 
The last confrontation of this strategic interaction pairing occurred in early 2002 with 
Operation ANACONDA.  Operation ANACONDA was an attempt to flush out insurgents 
that were massing in the mountains around Shah-e-Kot valley, in the Paktia region not far 
from Tora Bora.  The idea behind the operation was a classic hammer and anvil approach, 
using one force to dislodge the insurgents out of the mountains and drive them directly into 
the waiting guns of another force.82  When the U.S. began this operation, they estimated 
somewhere between 150–00 Taliban and al Qaeda forces hiding in the mountains; by the 
time the operation was over that number was increased to 750–000.83  The U.S. suffered 
eight dead Special Forces soldiers and an estimated 50 wounded from this Operation.84  The 
estimated number of enemy combatants killed is somewhere between 50 and 500.85  
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Although this may be considered relatively successful, it was not able to eliminate the 
Taliban and al Qaeda forces.  The surviving members were able to sow the seeds of a 
long-term insurgency.  
B. STRATEGIC INTERACTION #2 
By the end of Operation ANACONDA, the conflict changed.  After the 
conventional tanks and artillery of the Taliban were destroyed and the attempt to regroup 
around Tora Bora was quashed, the scattered remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda forces 
ran for cover.  Author Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist with decades of experience in 
Afghanistan, described the Taliban’s mass exodus to Pakistan for refuge: 
The Taliban did not just slip back across the border in the winter of 
2001/2002; they arrived in droves, by bus, taxi, and tractor, on camels and 
horses, and on foot. . . For many, it was not an escape but a return home—
back to the refugee camps in Balochistan where they had been brought up 
and where their families still lived; back to the madrassas where they had 
once studied; back to the hospitality of the mosques where they had once 
prayed.86 
In addition to finding geographical sanctuary, the Taliban and al Qaeda forces 
found security in numbers by joining efforts with other groups interested in undermining 
the new Afghan government, including Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network, 
disenfranchised local militants, foreign jihadis, and criminal organizations.87    
With a relatively safe operational base in Pakistan and newfound networking 
contacts, the Taliban forces began a guerilla-style war.  This is a classic indirect 
defensive strategy—draw out the war and inflict casualties whenever able until the 
attacker gives up.  In Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, Antonio Giustozzi described the 
“post-2001 Taliban insurgency” as a “typical case of asymmetric conflict, defined as ‘a 
weaker adversary using unconventional means, stratagems, or niche capabilities to 
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overcome a stronger power.’”88  The niche capabilities used by the Taliban were an 
intimate knowledge of the rugged Afghanistan terrain, an ability to blend in with the local 
population, and freedom to cross back and forth from Pakistan. 
Even though the Taliban and al Qaeda forces switched to an indirect defense 
strategy, the U.S. continued a direct attack.  This is especially puzzling when considering 
the fact that there were troops in country that could have taken the lead on an indirect 
strategy.  Special Forces units have traditionally been the U.S. military’s experts in 
indirect attack.  Some of the core roles of Special Forces include counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency.  Additionally, these forces encourage unorthodox approaches and 
unconventional thinking while paying particular attention to political context and 
implications.  In short, they would have been well suited to lead an indirect attack 
strategy against the remaining scattered remnants of the Taliban and they were already in 
theater.   
However, by this time, the U.S. was able to increase the conventional troop levels 
in Afghanistan.  Like the Soviets, the U.S. used Bagram as a key staging area.  The allied 
headquarters was moved from Kuwait to Bagram, bringing in a conventional forces 
three-star general to command all aspects of combat operations in Afghanistan, “from air 
attacks to Special Forces raids.”89  With the arrival of the conventional forces, Special 
Forces were relegated to a support role.  With all of the extra troops and amenities, 
Bagram began to resemble a base in the U.S. more than a forward staging area.  One 
soldier described the transformation of the base by saying, “The grown-ups are taking 
over.”90  This transformation of force type and command and control structures had a 
profound impact on the execution of the conflict.  Perhaps most significantly, Special 
Forces, the group with the training and experience most conducive to lead an indirect 
strategy, were incorporated into the overall direct attack strategy of the conventional 
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forces.  As such, they engaged in mostly hunter-killer missions of high-value targets 
while the conventional military took the lead on all other aspects of the war.   
Throughout 2002, the Taliban spent much of its effort avoiding direct 
confrontation with coalition forces while trying to establish bases of control over local 
populations and areas.  According to Giutsozzi, they used “small teams of ten to twenty 
insurgents” to infiltrate the Afghan countryside from Pakistan “with the purpose of 
identifying villages that could provide hospitality and support.”91  The Taliban also 
moved supplies, including weapons, ammunition, and food, from Pakistan into 
Afghanistan to support the insurgency.92  These combined efforts laid the foundation 
upon which to build an insurgency by spreading pro-Taliban propaganda and threatening 
elements of the population that were hostile to the Taliban.  Even as early as April 2002, 
the insurgents began offensive attacks aimed at overthrowing the Afghan government and 
coercing U.S. and coalition withdrawal.93 
By and large, the U.S. and Afghan governments ignored the budding Taliban 
insurgency.  Initially, the U.S. was opposed to expanding operations to include nation 
building outside of a centralized government in Kabul, which would have been a 
necessary part of an effective counterinsurgency campaign.94  Even if the U.S. had not 
been opposed to nation building, there were not enough U.S. forces to stabilize the 
country since General Franks’ operational concept for the war was an intentionally small 
U.S. footprint.95  There were not enough well-trained Afghanis to make up for the 
shortfall.  Additionally, the U.S. had already turned much of its attention towards Iraq 
and the Afghan government relied on the seemingly overwhelming power of the U.S. to 
destroy the insurgents, even in the remote areas along the Pakistan border.96 
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Despite the overwhelmingly conventional leadership, there were some promising 
beginnings of an indirect attack counterinsurgency effort at this time—mostly through 
militias.  However, these militias were not incorporated into a theater-wide indirect 
strategy.  Additionally, without an understanding of the critical role the militias could 
play in stabilizing Afghanistan, little attention was given to ensuring proper oversight and 
direction, which led to mismanagement and corruption. 
The first of the militias was the Afghan Security Forces (ASF).  The ASF were 
various groups of anti-Taliban forces, including members of the Northern Alliance that 
helped bring down the Taliban.  They provided U.S. Special Forces with invaluable 
insight on local knowledge, cultural understanding, and communication as well as 
provided security for many fire bases.97  They were demobilized in 2006 over “concerns 
held by the Afghan government and coalition command about non-government militias, 
sovereignty and legitimacy” and questions about their “loyalty, brutality, cost and 
effectiveness.”98 
Another promising beginning to a counterinsurgency force was the formation of 
the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF), which were private militias under the Ministry of 
Defense (MoD) that provided approximately 75,000 personnel for security in 2002.  
However, due largely to mismanagement by the MoD, by 2003 their numbers were only 
45,000.  Continued lack of funding, poor discipline, and an ill-defined chain of command 
eroded the AMF forces’ effectiveness.  The bulk of the AMF units were unable to mount 
any effective resistance by 2003 and were disbanded by 2005. 99 
Members of disbanded ASF and AMF units were encouraged to join the Afghan 
National Police (ANP).  The ANP was initially created from local militias to maintain 
order.  The ANP was organized under the oversight of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI).  
However, the MoI was not able to manage the salaries of its forces any better than the 
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MoD: sometimes payments to the ANP policemen were up to a year late.100  Perhaps due 
to these salary problems, the ANP developed a reputation for corruption.  Numerous 
counts of ANP bribes, unlawful taxes, involvement with narcotics trade, smuggling, 
looting, etc., led to the widespread distrust of the ANP by the local populations. 101  A 
study by Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation described the ANP as both corrupt and 
incompetent, “often unable to perform basic patrolling, conduct counterinsurgency 
operations, protect reconstruction projects, prevent border incursions, or conduct 
counternarcotics operations.”102  The ANP was largely ineffective in combating the 
insurgency and in many cases even aided the insurgency more than countered it. 
The last group to address here is the Afghan National Army (ANA), organized 
under the auspices of the MoD.  Ignoring the many problems associated with the ANA, 
including recruiting, training, equipping, funding, desertion, and accusations of 
corruption, the strategic employment of the ANA is most important. 103  The ANA was 
formed in the image of and mentored largely by U.S. conventional forces.  Additionally, 
the ANA was used almost as an auxiliary force to increase the number of soldiers U.S. 
forces could field and were thus part of the overall strategy of the U.S. and coalition 
forces.  As a result, the under-funded ANA is just as reliant on logistics and air power as 
its U.S. counterparts and used as part of the overall direct attack strategy.104 
It seems the longer the asymmetric nature of the Afghanistan conflict continued 
the deeper the Taliban forces were able to embed themselves in the local population and 
the stronger they became.  This was achieved largely through the support system initially 
emplaced by the Taliban vanguard teams throughout 2002.  This is the classic “ink spot” 
insurgency technique; initially establish small areas of control.  From these areas, expand 
control outward, like ink on blotting paper.  As the support network developed and 
matured, it enabled a stronger military resistance to the Afghan and coalition 
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governments.  This, in turn, allowed the Taliban to set up a popularly accepted shadow 
government of their own in areas that the Afghan government in Kabul could not 
control.105  The goal was to create a Taliban stronghold with greater control over the 
population than was possible from Kabul.   
Increasing their own strength was only half of the ink spot technique used by the 
Taliban.  The other half was decreasing the strength of their enemy.  As part of their 
indirect defense campaign, the Taliban embarked on a demoralization campaign.  They 
specifically targeted foreign troops and “collaborationists”—those Afghans who worked 
as interpreters for the coalition forces or as part of the newly formed Afghan government, 
including pro-government militia and even the Afghan National Army.106 
In the absence of an effective theater-wide counterinsurgency force, the Taliban 
was able to build support and extend its reach into Afghanistan.  By the spring of 2003, 
the Taliban insurgents were able to begin an offensive in earnest with guerrilla attacks on 
provinces that had little U.S. presence.107  The Taliban began an assassination campaign 
aimed at killing those collaborating with U.S. and coalition forces.  Governors, police 
chiefs, clerics, non-governmental organization workers, and even village informers were 
killed during this stage.  At about the same time, the Taliban began targeting schools, as 
perhaps the only state-provided service that reached all the way down to the village level.  
Teachers, parents, and students—especially schoolgirls—were threatened.108 
Even by 2003, the sustained asymmetric strategic interaction frustrated many who 
could see the big picture.  Robert Kaplan is a reporter who spent time covering the 
Afghan conflict embedded with Special Forces.  He also had previous experience in 
Afghanistan covering the mujahedeen’s battle against the Soviets in the 1980s.  Kaplan 
hinted at his dismay in 2003, two years into U.S. involvement, when he wrote, “Of the 
roughly 10,000 American troops in Afghanistan, only a fraction of them are doing 
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anything directly pivotal to the stabilization of the country.  The rest are either part of a 
long support tail or part of newly-created layers of command at Bagram Air Base . . . 
which micro-manage and complicate the work of a relatively small number of Army SF 
(Green Berets) located at various ‘fire bases.’”109  Kaplan’s displeasure became even 
more apparent when he continued by saying, “Instead of powering-down to a flattened 
hierarchy of small, autonomous units dispersed over a wide area—what the 1940 Marine 
‘Small Wars Manual’ recommends for fighting a guerrilla insurgency—we have 
barricaded ourselves into a mammoth, Cold War-style base at Bagram that drains 
resources from the fire bases.”110 
Much to the consternation of people such as Kaplan, the asymmetric strategic 
interaction continued and the imbalance began to pay dividends for the Taliban, who 
attempted to control the country.  The targeting of teachers and schools caused the 
closure of many schools.  The Taliban then offered to replace the state-sponsored schools 
and support ones that would teach the “Islamic” curriculum, open to both boys and veiled 
girls.111  They also targeted non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as “vehicles of 
moral corruption.”112  That tactic was quite effective, causing a drastic reduction in the 
number and reach of NGOs operating in Afghanistan.  Some of those that did continue 
providing services were forced to bribe the Taliban in order to be allowed to operate.113 
Reporter Tim McGirk described the Taliban in 2005 as a movement in its final 
throes and as “a busted flush.”114  He cited the failure of the Taliban to mount a 
coordinated offensive as a signal of the weakness of the Taliban.  He further offered 
empirical evidence of the U.S. success in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan  
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population through multiple Civil Affairs projects, including digging wells, providing 
medical care, and building schools.  As a result, the locals alerted NATO forces to a 
Taliban-placed roadside bomb.115   
Unfortunately, McGirk’s description of the Taliban does not seem to capture the 
general trend across the country at this time.  Other evidence suggests the success story 
described by McGirk was an isolated incident and not a general trend.  Anthony 
Cordesman, from the Strategy Centre for Strategic and International Studies, described 
the exponential increase in Taliban strength by almost every metric available.  From 2005 
to 2006, the Taliban areas of de facto government increased by more than 400%, direct 
fire attacks by almost 300%, suicide attacks by more than 600%, attacks on Afghan 
forces by 300%, and attacks on NATO forces more than 270%.116 
By 2006, the ink spot expansion strategy of the Taliban produced undeniable 
results—they were able to pursue a coordinated offensive.  This was the first time since 
Operation ANACONDA that the Taliban “openly challenged the foreign contingents in a 
large battle.”117  The Taliban assembled a large group of fighters in Pashmul, 
approximately 12 miles outside of Kandahar.  They chose this area for a few reasons.  
First, it was close enough to Kandahar to pose a significant threat to the regional capital.  
Second, because of its unique geography consisting of high walled compounds, grape 
vineyards, escape tunnels, trenches, and many drainage ditches, the Taliban believed it 
would be very difficult for the U.S. and coalition forces to mount an effective attack on 
the area.  This belief was supported by the Soviet’s failure to control the area during their 
invasion of Afghanistan.  Third, the Taliban believed the large civilian presence would 
prevent coalition forces from bombing the area, thus marginalizing their advantage of air 
power.  An estimated 1,500–2,000 Taliban concentrated in Pashmul for the attack.  The 
U.S. responded by evacuating much of the local population from the area and then 
raining down 2,000 lb bombs.  These actions were combined with a large scale offensive 
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using both conventional troops and Special Forces.  The result was an estimated 1,100 
Taliban killed as well as “significant civilian losses” of those noncombatants that did not 
evacuate the area.118  The Taliban’s actions at Pashmul represent a single battle that 
pitted the U.S. direct attack against a Taliban direct defense.  The Taliban’s tactical 
failure at Pashmul resulted in a return to their overall indirect defense strategy; they 
focused on small group guerrilla tactics to rebuild and strengthen while prolonging the 
conflict. 
By 2006, it was apparent to almost all involved that the insurgency was a deeply 
rooted problem and counterinsurgency efforts needed to be increased.  This sentiment 
was captured well in a Small Wars Journal article: 
Our military has a predisposition to focus on enemy forces and capabilities 
and the confrontation between friendly and enemy forces, with little 
emphasis on the social or political context within which the confrontation 
takes place. The change to seeing the population as the center of gravity is 
a major shift for conventional forces. It is a serious adjustment from our 
current and predominantly conventional military thinking about 
warfare.119   
C. ATTEMPTED STRATEGIC INTERACTION #3 
Under a new Secretary of Defense and as part of a growing recognition for a need 
to adapt, the military began to reshape itself.  Pressure was applied from troops in the 
field in order to adjust doctrine to address the situations they were confronted with on the 
ground.  As a result, the Army and Marine Corps released a new counterinsurgency 
manual.120  Some were quite impressed with the progress the U.S. military made in 
changing itself into a force for counterinsurgency operations.  One paper called the 
military transformation “the most comprehensive retooling of a force while in the midst 
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of an active war since the German Army in 1917.”121  Even if this assertion was correct, 
it still might not have been enough: the classic story of too little too late.   
When indirect strategy methods were implemented under conventional leadership 
and executed by conventional troops, even proven tactics were “implemented in a 
mechanical and ultimately ineffective way.”122  Without a comprehensive understanding 
of the concepts of a true counterinsurgency campaign, the U.S. military continued 
focusing primarily on the capturing and killing aspects of counterinsurgency.  One prime 
example was the introduction of TF ODIN, which stands for Task Force Observe, Detect, 
Identify, Neutralize.  TF ODIN introduced “unmanned aerial vehicles and unconventional 
aircraft to find and kill thousands of roadside-bomb emplacers.”123  The Task Force 
aircraft use state of the art technology to find insurgents and then high caliber machine 
guns and laser guided Hellfire missiles to kill them—a decidedly direct strategy 
approach.  In theory the military may be pursuing counterinsurgency, but it is done with a 
direct attack flavor and not using an indirect attack strategy usually associated with 
counterinsurgency.   
At the high-dollar cost of initiatives like TF ODIN, it is uncertain how long the 
U.S. will be able to continue this tack.  A direct attack strategy to counterinsurgency tries 
to capture or kill all insurgents.  An indirect attack method would focus more on the 
forces driving people towards insurgency and removing sanctuaries.  Without that focus, 
the Taliban have the strategic advantage.  One reporter described that advantage well, 
“The Taliban have a seemingly inexhaustible supply of recruits, enjoy sanctuary in 
Pakistan and almost certainly have greater staying power than the foreign troops.”124   
To recount, the U.S. military actions in Afghanistan were initially very direct—
aiming to destroy the capacity of the Taliban to remain in control of the country and 
 
121 Philipp Rotmann, David Tohn and Jaron Wharton, Learning Under Fire: The U.S. Military, 
Dissent and Organizational Learning Post-9/11, #09-04 ed. (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2009), 3. 
122 Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 191. 
123 Kris Osborn, “Army Sends ODIN to Afghanistan,” Army Times December 15, 2008, 
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/12/web_defense_121508_army_ODIN/ (accessed June 3, 2009). 
 53
                                                                                                                                                
capture or kill as many al Qaeda members as possible.  The Taliban responded with a 
direct defense and was thoroughly routed; Kabul was overthrown in a month.  The U.S. 
military was ideally suited to this kind of interaction and excelled at it.  Unfortunately, it 
was not well prepared for the next phase.  After being forced to find sanctuary, mostly 
across the border into Pakistan, the Taliban regrouped and began an insurgency, a 
classically indirect defense.  The U.S. and coalition forces did not have enough troops or 
the mindset to fight an effective counterinsurgency campaign and continued with a direct 
attack strategy.  This asymmetric strategic interaction allowed the Taliban to build 
strength and draw out the conflict, with the intent of eroding U.S. resolve and resources.  
Even though a counterinsurgency campaign is almost universally accepted as required, it 
is prosecuted using decidedly direct means. 
The election of U.S. President Barack Obama may usher in a new strategic 
interaction.  President Obama has dispatched 17,000 new troops to Afghanistan in 
addition to a surge of civilian development experts to help stabilize the country.125  
However, any increase in troops is likely to fail if part of a continued direct attack 
strategy—as clearly demonstrated by the Soviets.  The naming of Lt General McChrystal 
as the new commander of Afghanistan was a more promising development.  General 
McChrystal, as a graduated commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, 
should be extremely familiar with the theoretical knowledge and practical application of 
an indirect strategy.126  This assumption was bolstered by a very population-centric 
counterinsurgency strategy put forth by General McChrystal.127  However, General 
McChrystal is not known for his effectiveness in counterinsurgency; rather, he has a 
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“reputation for killing.”128  As such, he may apply a very direct approach to 
counterinsurgency.  It is still too early to judge how his strategy will be implemented.  
Even if it is implemented in a truly indirect attack fashion, he still has his work cut out 
for him as the Taliban have a seven-year head start. 
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VII. OTHER CONFLICTS AT A GLANCE 
However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the 
results. 
— Winston Churchill 
 
This section is not intended to provide in-depth analysis of other conflicts.  It aims 
to capture the highlights of other wars using the framework presented in this thesis.  As 
such, this section does not contain the same detail that was provided in the Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM case study.  Even without that level of detail, the characteristics 
of each war are broadly identifiable.   
A. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
U.S. involvement in Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) is another 
useful case study for studying asymmetric warfare because it fits classical asymmetric 
patterns with the U.S. as the strong attacker against Iraq as the weak defender.  
Additionally, the conflict is not completely over yet, though the U.S. appears to be 
winning.   
The U.S. invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003.129  The plan was to first target the 
Iraqi government leadership and capture the capital of Baghdad.  The belief was that after 
this was accomplished, a stable, democratic government would replace the existing 
authoritarian regime led by Saddam Hussein.  As such, invading U.S. troops made a 
lightning-quick dash to Baghdad, largely bypassing cities and towns along the way.  The 
relatively small and extremely agile elements of the U.S. Army were aided by the 
precision-guided munitions of the U.S. Air Force.  The strategy of the U.S. was 
predominantly aimed at destroying Iraqi capacity to resist—therefore, it was a direct 
attack.  By and large, the Iraqi military “did little if any fighting.”130  Those elements that 
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confronted U.S. forces did so head-on using a direct defense.  This interaction played to 
the advantages of the U.S. and the Iraqi conventional defense capacity was quickly 
crushed.131  Baghdad fell on April 9, 2003, less than a month after the U.S. invaded.  
Events went so well, that on May 1, 2003, with a large “Mission Accomplished” banner 
in the background, President Bush declared that major combat operations in Iraq were 
complete, the U.S. was victorious, and now was the time to start securing and 
reconstructing Iraq.132   
Unfortunately, the bulk of OIF planning was focused on combat operations; very 
little attention had been given to developing a post-Saddam Iraq.133  The predominant 
feeling in the U.S. prior to the war was captured by Kenneth Adelman, who wrote, “I 
believe demolishing Hussein’s military power and liberating Iraq would be a 
cakewalk.”134  Adelman was correct:  but demolishing Saddam Hussein’s military power 
was not all that was required to achieve U.S. goals in Iraq and establish a stable, 
democratic nation-state.  The belief of the Bush administration seemed to be that a stable 
democracy would spring up as soon as Saddam was removed.  However, in the words of 
Steven Metz, “Those insisting that democratization would come easily—Iraqi exiles, 
scholars such as Ajami and Bernard Lewis, conservative pundits, and, for that matter, 
administration officials—had either been out of Iraq for a long time or never been there at 
all.”135  Despite the phenomenal success of the U.S. in major combat operations, the war 
in Iraq was nowhere near as complete as the “Mission Accomplished” banner heralded.  
Disorder began almost immediately after the fall of Saddam.  “Even before [General] 
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Franks began his victory lap, Iraq collapsed into a spasm of looting and street crime. . . 
Anarchy sparked public anger, which gathered energy with each passing week.”136   
The most important reason the war was not over was probably the failure of the 
U.S. to establish security.  Without order and security, public anger was quickly directed 
towards the U.S., who had deposed the Saddam regime, which had at least provided the 
Iraqi citizens with order.  They viewed the failure of the U.S. to restore order and services 
as a personal affront.137  The reason for this failing was a lack of personnel.  The number 
of U.S. troops required to win in Iraq had been a point of contention in the planning 
phase.  Before entry into the war, Army chief of staff General Shinseki testified in front 
of Congress that “‘several hundred thousand’ troops would be needed for occupation duty 
in Iraq after an American intervention.”138  Shortly after General Shinseki’s estimated 
troop requirement was given, both Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary 
Wolfowitz stated that General Shinseki’s number was much higher than would actually 
be required and they quickly named the general’s replacement.139   
Rumsfeld had spent his tenure as SecDef leading the transformation of the U.S. 
military into an agile, high-tech force that leveraged the benefits of superior technology 
in short, high-intensity, conventional conflicts.  In short, his vision for the U.S. military 
was an efficient killing machine.  The number of personnel in the military was reduced 
under this vision.  He was against using large numbers of troops in Iraq to help support 
his vision of military transformation.   
It is possible that Rumsfeld’s vision may have worked in Iraq had security 
personnel been obtained from somewhere, even if not from the U.S. military.  One source 
of such personnel was the Iraqi military.  Apparently, the initial plan had been to keep the 
Iraqi army intact, which would have provided an additional 400,000 security 
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personnel.140  However, that plan was not followed through as the army was quickly 
dissolved.  Not only did that decision reduce the number of security personnel available, 
it also increased the pool of potential insurgents. 
Without adequate personnel in Iraq to maintain security, the level of violence 
steadily escalated.  Targets included Iraqi infrastructure, Americans, U.S. military 
convoys, and even Iraqis who worked with the Americans—particularly translators.141  
For months, military leaders refused to call the violence an insurgency.  However, on 
July 16, 2003, the newly appointed commander of U.S. Central Command, General 
Abizaid, finally acknowledged in a Pentagon briefing that the U.S. was fighting a 
“classical guerrilla-type war.”142  He further characterized the insurgency as getting more 
organized and learning, advising that in order for the U.S. to win, “we’ve got to adapt to 
their tactics, techniques and procedures.”143  It was clear that the Iraqis had switched to 
an indirect defense. 
As previously discussed, Rumsfeld had transformed the U.S. military into a small, 
very efficient killing force.  It is understandable, then, why the U.S. approach to 
counterinsurgency was focused on capturing and killing its way to victory.  This strategy 
was epitomized by a deck of playing cards featuring the 52 most wanted Iraqi leaders.  
The deck represented a capture/kill list to victory.  President Bush confirmed this strategy 
in a speech given on June 28 at Fort Bragg, NC when he stated, “Our mission in Iraq is 
clear.  We’re hunting down the terrorists.”144  Even though the enemy in Iraq was clearly 
(and successfully) employing an indirect defense, the U.S. continued with a 
predominantly direct attack.   
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In 2004, much of the violence that had previously been aimed at the U.S. was 
redirected between Sunni-Shia rivals.145  This added another complication to the violence 
of Iraq and placed the U.S. in the middle of a civil war.  Additionally, it promoted the 
spread of violence to areas that had previously been quiet.  By the autumn of 2004, Iraqi 
insurgents had “near control over important parts of central Iraq, especially the cities of 
Fallujah, Ramadi, Samarra, and Baqubah.”146 
 There were some successful applications of effective counterinsurgency at this 
time: notably, in Tal Afar.  Here, the Army established continuous presence while 
clearing the area of insurgents.  Great care was taken not to incite further hatred from the 
insurgents or the local population.  The results were very good and were even noted in a 
speech by President Bush.147  However, the results achieved required a lot of manpower, 
which was not available to replicate the Tal Afar model across all of Iraq. 
As a result, the counterinsurgency efforts were woefully inadequate since they 
“concentrated their efforts on hunting down and killing insurgents.”148  The insurgents 
continued to inflict serious losses on the U.S.  By late 2006, many in the U.S. began to 
view Iraq as “unwinnable.”  In a Hail Mary effort, the U.S. implemented a “surge”—an 
increase in troop levels by approximately 20,000—in an attempt to turn the war around.  
The surge is often recognized as the turning point for the U.S. in Iraq.  However, it is 
unlikely that just placing an additional 20,000 troops in Iraq doing more of what wasn’t 
working before would turn the tide of the war.  If the surge was the reason the U.S. 
turned Iraq around, it is most likely because it was introduced under the leadership of 
General Petraeus as the new Commanding General in Iraq.  General Petraeus, a 
predominantly conventional forces leader, had learned indirect strategy lessons from 
studying the Vietnam War and by practicing it during his own experience in Mosul, Iraq 
 
145 Metz, Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy, 164. 
146 Ibid., 169. 
147 Joe Hallett and Jonathan Riskind, “Bush: We’re Staying in Iraq; President Uses Cleveland Speech 
to Assure Nation He has Clear Plan for Iraq’s Future,” The Columbus Dispatch, March 21, 2006 (accessed 
September 10, 2009). 
148 Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005) (accessed 
September 10, 2009). 
 60
                                                
where he coined the phrase “money is ammunition.”  After leaving Mosul, General 
Petraeus, along with Marine General James Amos, wrote the Army’s field manual on 
counterinsurgency—replacing the previous version that was over 20 years old.149  The 
manual was a document focused on indirect warfare.  General Petraeus understood the 
need for an indirect strategy in Iraq and when he returned there as the theater commander.   
The leadership of General Petraeus could be called “well-timed” since he is 
largely credited with turning the tide in Iraq.  However, he was the fourth commander of 
the Multi-National Force in Iraq to deal with an insurgency that had been continuing for 
as many years.  Additionally, he was a “conventional guy” who happened to be interested 
in, study, and understand counterinsurgency.  It is very fortuitous that he came along 
when he did.  If the U.S. had deliberately planned to get a counterinsurgency expert in 
charge of Iraq, it would have made sense to have that happen three to four years earlier 
than it actually occurred. 
Another reason the war in Iraq turned around about this time is due to a change in 
attitudes by the local Sunni population.  This change has been called the “Anbar 
awakening,” in which Sunni militias agreed to help the U.S. fight al Qaeda.  The 
awakening actually began before the surge and before General Petraeus took command.  
Sheik Abdul Sattar approached the U.S. Army saying, “I swear to God, if we have good 
weapons, if we have good vehicles, if we have good support, I can fight al Qaeda all the 
way to Afghanistan.”150  The U.S. then supported Sheik Sattan and his militia. 
 The awakening is most interesting because this approach of arming militia groups 
had been proposed in 2004, when the expectation of victory was much higher.  However, 
Ambassador Bremer was against armed militias and attempted to disarm them.  Only 
after the expectation of victory was had dropped to a level that U.S. leadership was 
willing to try more unconventional methods were militias incorporated into an 
overarching strategy.  By working with the Sunni population, the U.S. significantly 
eroded their will to fight. 
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Another key in reducing violence was a ceasefire agreement with Shi’ite 
leaders—particularly Muqtada al Sadr, leader of the Jaysh al-Mahdi Army.  This 
ceasefire agreement appeared only after “Sadr’s control over his militia was diminishing 
and the movement was beginning to splinter.”151  These events did not occur because of 
direct actions of the U.S. military.  Rather, they were effects of the militia’s “corruption, 
intimidation and extortion of the Shi’a population to enhance their power and wealth.”152 
The U.S. did eventually adopt a much more indirect strategy in Iraq—largely 
because of an extremely low expectation of victory and a willingness to try just about 
anything to turn the tide of the war.  It is important to note that this change was not 
actively initiated by the U.S. military.  Instead, it was the result of a change in attitudes 
by the local population that had previously fought a guerrilla-style war against the U.S.  
Fortunately, the U.S. military was open enough to accept the proposed alliance.  The 
resulting indirect attack strategy and symmetric strategic interaction, coupled with cease-
fire agreements with Shi’ite militias, reversed the direction of the war.  By November 
2007, the U.S. military drawdown in Iraq began. 
B. USSR IN AFGHANISTAN 
Involvement of the USSR in Afghanistan demonstrates the interactions of a strong 
actor other than the U.S. attacking a weak actor.  With Afghanistan as the same weak 
actor as the OEF case study, the only variable changed (other than a minimal thirty year 
time difference) is the strong actor. 
The USSR military initially entered Afghanistan in 1979, ostensibly at the behest 
of the Marxist-friendly Afghan government, led by the communist People’s Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).153  The Afghan government tried to “revolutionize Afghan 
society almost overnight.”154  The abrupt changes, including land, social, and economic 
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reforms, were implemented using force when necessary.155  When the population 
provided resistance to these changes, they did so in the historically classic Afghan 
fashion—armed revolt.156  The Soviets provided combat troops to aid the PDPA in 
quelling the rebellion against the communist regime.  However, the direct attack strategy 
employed further incited the population and galvanized resistance under a “blood for 
blood” mentality.157  As Soviet involvement continued and deepened, the PDPA became 
more and more of a puppet government and was delegitimized in the eyes of the Afghan 
population as such. 
The conflict was stereotypical of asymmetric warfare; the Soviet military 
controlled the major population centers while focusing on killing the enemy.  The 
mujahedeen guerrilla fighters controlled the rural areas and tried to blend in with the local 
population.  From the safety provided by the protection of the local population, the 
mujahedeen would inflict casualties on the Soviet military predominantly through acts of 
sabotage and terrorism.  This asymmetric strategic interaction characterized the initial 
years of the war.   
After initial efforts of the Soviet army focusing on killing the enemy proved 
ineffective, they changed approaches.  Instead of killing their enemies they started killing 
everyone!  The Soviet method of counterinsurgency consisted of “depopulating areas of 
tough resistance.”158  As such, the Soviet approach to counterinsurgency—kill everyone 
and destroy everything—was still very direct.   
For this conflict, the mujahedeen were driven to an indirect defense strategy 
largely out of necessity.  Even though the mujahedeen were supported by fighters from 
around the Muslim community and military aid from the U.S., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
China, and others, they still did not have anywhere near the military resources available 
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to them that the Soviet army possessed.159  Since they were fighting to dislodge the 
“infidel” invaders from their homeland, the mujahedeen also had much more at stake than 
the Soviets.  As such, they were permitted as much time and freedom of action as it 
would take to achieve their goal of purging the Soviets. 
Conversely, the institutional predisposition of the Soviet military was probably 
the most powerful driver towards a direct attack strategy.   The Soviet army that invaded 
Afghanistan was described as “structured  and  trained  for  large‐scale  conventional 
warfare”  that  resulted  from  its  evolutionary history.160    The words  of  one  author 
very clearly capture the direct‐oriented institutional predisposition of the USSR: 
Afghanistan confirmed what was already suspected about the general 
fighting capacity of the Soviet Army—it relied more on a concentration 
(quantity) of forces and artillery preparation than on flexibility and 
maneuver. However, there is a more puzzling paradox—Soviet military 
experts knew what to do to win in Afghanistan but did not do it because of 
a cultural reluctance, in other words, cultural inertia. There was no desire 
to change the doctrine, training, and organization of an Army that was 
well adapted for a European war against its principal adversary.161  
The fact that the Soviets maintained a direct attack strategy throughout nine years 
of losses supports the theory that the institutional predisposition was the overriding factor 
pushing towards a direct strategy.  Additionally, the size and resource advantage of the 
Soviets probably led to a high expectation of victory that would reduce the likelihood of 
changing strategies.  After almost a decade of conflict, the USSR decided that even if 
Afghanistan was “winnable,” it was not worth the resources that would be required.  The 
USSR decided to cut its losses and left Afghanistan in 1989. 
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C. U.S. INTERACTIONS IN VIETNAM 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam was a landmark defeat that always ends up as a test 
bed for any U.S. military theory.  Arreguín-Toft’s case study analysis of U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam using strategic interaction was not entirely convincing.  
Therefore, this paper applied the strategic interaction model with strategy drivers to U.S. 
intervention in Vietnam.  Interestingly, the application of U.S. power in Vietnam aligns 
closely with the previous example of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan; the U.S. entered 
the war in an advisory role to assist the government of the Republic of Vietnam and 
gradually escalated involvement and taking control of the conflict. 
Perhaps the most unique aspect of the Vietnam War is the fact that the North 
Vietnamese essentially fielded two different armies: the conventional North Vietnamese 
Army (NVA) and the guerrilla-styled units that infiltrated South Vietnam, the Viet Cong 
(VC).  Therefore, in order to apply the strategic interaction theory to the conflict in an 
organized manner, it makes sense to look at U.S. interaction against the NVA and VC 
individually first and then combine the results into an overall result. 
Initial U.S. involvement in Vietnam was through an advisory role.162  Because 
most of the advisors were from the conventional army, they advocated a decidedly direct 
strategy for South Vietnam.  This direct strategy was applied against both the NVA and 
VC forces.  When this strategic interaction did not achieve the results that the U.S. (and 
South Vietnam) had hoped for, U.S. decision makers attributed failure to ineptitude on 
the part of the South Vietnamese army.  The fix was to introduce U.S. forces to do the 
fighting for the South Vietnamese—to change the war into a “war for which Americans 
would be responsible.”163  This led to the large-scale introduction of U.S. troops into the 
war. 
On the ground, those U.S. troops pursued a direct attack.  This was most likely 
due to the fact that the bulk of the leadership was trained in and more comfortable with 
 
162 John Schlight, The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965–1968 (Washington, 
D.C.: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1988), 1, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS49304. 
163 Loren Baritz, Backfire: A History of how American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us 
Fight the Way We Did (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 175. 
 65
                                                
these conventional tactics.  Additionally, this strategy was also very conducive to 
quantifiable measurements, such as body counts.  Employment of this strategy proved 
tactically adequate against the NVA and VC.  Against the NVA, this was a symmetric 
strategic interaction that was rather effective for the U.S.  However, against the guerrilla 
units of the VC, this was an asymmetric strategic interaction.  The U.S. succeeded in 
capturing and killing many VC forces while enduring relatively few casualties.  Despite 
many U.S. tactical successes, the VC forces were able to regroup, recruit, and rearm.  
Because of this tactical success and the fact that the U.S. never lost a major battle, the 
U.S. continuously believed that progress was being made and that they could see “the 
light at the end of the tunnel.”164  This slowly increased the U.S. casualties and dragged 
out the conflict—a result not favorable for the U.S. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. military also executed Operation ROLLING THUNDER, an 
air campaign against the North Vietnamese designed to “coerce North Vietnam into 
refraining from support of the southern insurgency.”165  The NVA used a highly 
sophisticated, multi-layered anti-aircraft defense system that resulted in heavy U.S. 
losses.166  Although there are many arguments about the specific reasons ROLLING 
THUNDER failed (including too many restrictions on targets, over control by civilians, 
devolvement into an interdiction campaign, and an ill-conceived gradual increase in 
punishment design), the end result was an indirect attack strategy against the direct 
defense strategy of the NVA and North Vietnam.  This interaction favored the North 
Vietnamese and the operation was halted due to its failure to produce the desired strategic 
results and mounting losses.167 
As the war progressed, U.S. strategy matured.  To combat the VC threat in the 
south, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) united many 
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smaller programs under a unifying umbrella with the intended goal of pacifying the South 
Vietnamese population.168  Many of the strategies used to pacify the population were 
quite indirect.  Perhaps the most direct operation under the CORDS program was 
Operation PHOENIX, which was aimed at dismantling the VC infrastructure.169  
However, this direct strategy was performed in support of a larger, indirect strategy goal 
of severing the South Vietnamese population from the insurgency.  This change towards 
a more indirect strategy was more effective than the previous attempts using exclusively 
direct means.  By 1971, the bulk of South Vietnam was reasonably safe, as most of the 
VC had been routed and local armed forces had been established to finish the job and 
prevent their return.170 
Just like the ground attack strategy changed, the air attack strategy changed as 
well.  Operation LINEBACKER “was designed to cripple North Vietnam’s ability to 
conduct offensive operations inside South Vietnam.”171  The military was given more 
latitude to select targets, most of which were aimed at degrading the North’s capacity and 
war related resources.  The timing of this operation was crucial since the North was 
mounting a large-scale offensive against the South.  The result of this strategic interaction 
was effective, bringing North Vietnam to the negotiating table.172 
When put together, the U.S. entered Vietnam with asymmetric strategic 
interactions that favored the NVA and VC.  However, changes in the war and U.S. 
military employment led to strategic interactions that favored the U.S.  Unfortunately, 
this still did not result in a U.S. victory.  This paper takes the stance that the fundamental 
reason for the loss of Vietnam was the fact that the U.S., as a democratic regime, could 
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not “indefinitely sustain an inconclusive, unpopular war.”173  From that vantage point, 
the prolonged asymmetric strategic interactions at the beginning of the war were the 
major contributors to the war’s character taking on adjectives such as “inconclusive” and 
“unpopular.”  Those asymmetric strategic interactions eroded the military’s freedom of 
action by draining domestic support.  Although the institutional predisposition of the U.S. 
military was not insurmountable, it did not exactly turn on a dime, either.  By the time a 
new strategy was employed it proved to be too little too late; the American public had 
had decided to remove the U.S. military from the fight. 
D. INSIGHTS FROM CASE STUDIES 
All of the case studies addressed in this paper show a common pattern; strong 
actors begin asymmetric conflicts with a direct attack strategy.  Even when it is clear that 
weak actors resort to an indirect defense, there is a significant delay before a strong actor 
implements an indirect attack strategy if one is even implemented at all.  This 
phenomenon suggests that factors other than strictly probability of victory drive strategy 
implementation in asymmetric conflicts. 
The reason for this direct-oriented bias appears to be most attributable to the 
institutional predisposition.  The institutional predisposition is most likely tooled for 
symmetric, state-on-state conflict rather than asymmetric conflict.  Unfortunately, the 
effect of preparing a military for symmetric conflict appears to actually inhibit its ability 
to effectively wage asymmetric warfare.  The strong actor focus on symmetrical warfare 
is justifiable when considering that the viability of strong states could be threatened by 
other strong states while weak actors are not likely to pose much threat to the continued 
existence of strong states.  However, given the dominant position of the U.S. today and 
the small number of strong actor competitors, the “worst case” scenario of symmetric 
conflict should be balanced against the “most likely case” scenario of asymmetric 
conflict. 
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VIII. DISCUSSION 
Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s 
strategy. 
— Sun Tzu 
Richard Betts published an article titled, “Is Strategy an Illusion?”  He answered 
that question with, “Strategy is not always an illusion, but often it is.”174  The response 
this paper gives to the same question has an equal amount of skepticism.  Strategy 
selection does not appear to be as simple as a “choice” debated and then selected.  
Neither can it easily be altered after the conflict has begun.  Rather, strategy appears to be 
driven towards either direct or indirect by a variety of factors other than probability of 
victory.  These factors have quite a bit of momentum in determining strategy that is 
difficult to overcome.  The most important of these strategy drivers is the institutional 
predisposition because it is the most consistent across time and is the factor that the 
military has the most control over.   
Some instances appear to be more amenable to strategy changes.  One such 
situation is by sheer necessity when there is an asymmetry of risk and a way of life is on 
the line—as is often the case for weak actors.  Even if they have an institutional 
predisposition that favors direct strategies, this can be overcome predominantly through a 
large stake, which allows for a drawn out conflict and wide freedom of action.  This 
situation was demonstrated when the Taliban switched strategies against the U.S. and the 
Northern Alliance in 2002 and when the Iraqis changed strategies against the U.S. in 
2003. 
Conversely, strong actors appear much more likely to enact a strategy that does 
not align with their institutional predisposition only when external constraints are placed 
upon them, such as Rothstein highlighted as the case for U.S. involvement in the 
Philippines and El Salvador.175  Even when it is widely recognized that a different 
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strategy would be more beneficial, the adjustment is slow and awkward at best.  This has 
been demonstrated by the relatively stagnant U.S. strategy in Afghanistan since 2001.  It 
was also playing out that way in Iraq until the low expectation of victory led the U.S. 
military to simply accept an Iraqi solution to population security. 
Each empirical conflict that the U.S. enters provides different aspects funneling 
the military towards either a direct or indirect strategy.  Within that framework, both 
strategies must be viable options; indirect attack cannot be excluded due to the single 
driving factor of institutional predisposition.     
Some may argue that if you have to choose between the two types of attack, direct 
attack is the statistically better of the two options, since the strong attacker has a 77% 
chance of winning symmetric strategic interactions and still a 36% chance of winning 
asymmetric strategic interactions.  This argument is unacceptable for a couple of reasons.  
First, it is a false dilemma; there is no reason that a military should keep only one strategy 
in its repertoire.  At least when given restrictions, the U.S. military has proven that it can 
succeed with both types of strategies.  Second, by taking the indirect attack option 
completely off the table, enemies are certain to adapt accordingly.  The U.S. would 
probably be extremely efficient with direct attack but would likely find that every 
defender would then focus exclusively on indirect defense and the statistical advantage of 
a U.S. direct attack would vanish.  Edward Luttwak supported this logic when he pointed 
out that strategies can fail by being performed too well.176  His example was the French 
Maginot Line.  The Maginot Line was a superb defense.  In fact, it was so good that the 
Germans avoided it completely in WWII by going around it and making it irrelevant.  
Perhaps if the Maginot Line were less effective, the Germans would have invaded directly 
across the border and been slowed down enough for French forces to mass an effective 
resistance.  This paradoxical logic can be applied to the U.S., who is already very 
competent at conventional warfare.  If this became the sole strategy in the U.S. tool kit, 
challengers would avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. and instead, by necessity, 
choose an indirect strategy of defense. 
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Unless a variety of opinions are laid before us, we have no opportunity of 
selection, but are bound of necessity to adopt the particular view which 
may have been brought forward. 
— Herodotus 
 
The recommendation of this paper is that the U.S. military should make changes 
in its institutional predisposition so it does not favor direct attack almost to the point of 
excluding indirect attack as a viable option.  This recommendation is very timely since it 
is in fundamental agreement with the “balance” philosophy of Secretary of Defense 
Gates’ National Defense Strategy.177  Now may be the perfect time to make changes to 
the U.S. military’s institutional predisposition to strike a more equitable balance between 
direct and indirect. 
There are a number of requirements that changes to the existing institutional 
predisposition will need to satisfy.  These requirements are built upon the concepts 
explored in this paper.  First and foremost, any changes need to ensure a deliberate 
strategy selection.  There needs to be a mechanism in place to control strategy selection 
more than just a happenstance confluence of existing factors.  This selection mechanism 
will ensure strategy selections are appropriate to the environment and associated 
probability of victory.  It will also remove much of the “illusion” of strategy, as it will 
ensure strategy implementation is a result of deliberate choices.  From the case studies of 
this paper, strategy selection currently does not appear as deliberate as would be 
expected.   
Second, because of path dependence, the outcomes desired at the end of a conflict 
need to be analyzed before any strategy is implemented.  Inappropriate initial strategy 
execution could actually preclude the desired end; therefore, the desired goal should be 
analyzed before conflicts to ensure applied means have a logical and reasonable 
 
177 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy; Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign 
Affairs, January/February, 2009 (accessed August 26, 2009). 
 72
expectation of achieving desired goals.  This process should explore the multiple linkages 
between cause and effect on the way to desired ends.   
Third, there needs to be a designated champion for the indirect strategy.  Indirect 
strategy options need to be presented to the highest level of military decision makers for 
evaluation.  If decision makers are only presented with direct strategy options, it follows 
that only direct strategies will be implemented.   
The institutional predisposition of the military has shown a drift towards direct 
strategies.  The unique skill sets required for indirect warfare have been given short shrift 
through education, training, and experience in favor of those necessary for direct warfare.  
This phenomenon is consistent with organizational design theory; it is extremely difficult 
(if not impossible) to have one organization that is adept at dichotomous strategies—one 
of the strategies will dominate over the other.  One manner in which this happens is 
through the rewards system in which desired behaviors, such as number of enemy killed 
or number of bombs dropped, are measures of success.  These measures may be 
appropriate for direct strategies, but fail to measure anything meaningful for indirect 
strategies.  Yet if personnel who post large numbers are continuously rewarded through 
awards and promotions, it will encourage direct strategies at the cost of effective indirect 
strategies. 
To be an effective advocate of indirect strategies, a representative needs to be 
independent from the existing services in order to avoid the same drift towards direct 
attack.  Additionally, the indirect champion should be given the same status as the most 
prominent champions of direct strategies to ensure the indirect options are not suppressed 
before they can reach decision makers.  At a minimum, this would need to be at the 
Combatant Commander level and perhaps even as high as that of a Secretary. 
Fourth, the military needs to ensure that it maintains an effective indirect strategy 
capability.  This capability needs to be vigilantly maintained and not re-learned as 
required during conflict, because, in the words of former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, “you go to war with the Army you have. . . not the Army you might want or 
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wish to have at a later time.”178  Forces need to be familiar with the tactics and overall 
goals of indirect strategies to ensure the effective implementation of indirect strategies.  If 
this is not followed, the intricacies and nuances required in executing an indirect strategy 
will be carried out in a ham-handed manner, reducing their efficacy.  The U.S. military 
learned much about counterinsurgency throughout the Vietnam War.  Unfortunately, 
those lessons were not retained very well; immediately after U.S. withdrawal, two of the 
Special Forces groups were disbanded.  Over two decades later, the mistake was realized 
and they were finally reformed but much of the institutional learning had been lost.  The 
lessons, training, and skills learned during conflicts such as Vietnam are purchased at too 
high of a price to be dumped at the cessation of hostilities only to be relearned later 
through a new conflict, such as OEF or OIF. 
Lastly, the military should adopt some type of mechanism to continuously 
reassess the conflict and determine which type of strategy is more appropriate.  Following 
a change in the character of the conflict, the military should then be agile enough to enact 
a change in strategies.  This strategic agility could remove much of the opportunity 
insurgencies are given to gain support among the population, as occurred during direct 
attack operations by the U.S. in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  Had the U.S. military 
effectively adjusted to an indirect attack strategy sooner in both of those conflicts, the 
insurgencies may not have had the time and political space to gain the momentum that 
they did. 
Speaking in broad-brush terms, a more neutral institutional predisposition could 
be achieved with a counterbalance to the existing direct-focused force.  An organization 
concerned exclusively with indirect options would provide that overall balance.  One 
possibility would be to create a new organization within the military that would focus 
exclusively on indirect strategies.  This is what Rothstein argued for in Afghanistan and 
the Trouble Future of Unconventional Warfare when he advocated legislation to “create a 
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separate service” that would “provide the nation with unconventional warfare forces.”179  
The biggest benefit of this approach would be a DoD “in house” solution that should 
make inter-service coordination relatively smooth.  Unfortunately, legislation for another 
service would likely meet with entrenched resistance.  Another approach would be to 
change an existing organization to give it the lead on the indirect strategy.  Although this 
solution could avoid the problems associated with creating an entirely new organization, 
it may prove almost as difficult in the long run:  existing organizational factors may make 
it difficult to adapt an existing organization to the indirect strategy.  To avoid this 
problem, the U.S. could empower an existing organization that has demonstrated an 
inclination towards the indirect strategy, such as the CIA or the State Department.  
However, this solution would be outside of the DoD and could make interagency 
cooperation more difficult. 
As such, the best way of making these changes to the institutional predisposition 
of the U.S. military is a subject for another research project—most likely centered around 
organizational design theories.  Each different solution will have a variety of associated 
benefits and detriments that must be taken into account and systematically evaluated. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
The direct use of force is such a poor solution to any problem, it is 
generally employed only by small children and large nations. 
— David Friedman 
 
This paper approached conflicts with a few starting assumptions: that the military 
is sent into a conflict with the goal of victory; that a military is built to achieve victory 
across the entire spectrum of warfare; and that a military is built around a controlling 
theory of the best way to predict war outcomes.  From these starting assumptions, the 
paper built upon Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s theory of strategic interaction to create a game-
theoretic model to analyze implications.  That model showed that direct attack strategies 
are logical for strong actors in early stages of conflicts but not for prolonged conflicts 
after weak actors are forced to their dominant strategy of indirect defense.  The 
observation that strong actors often fail to change to an indirect attack strategy when 
appropriate is attributed to strategy selection being driven by factors other than 
probability of victory.  The most important of those factors is the institutional 
predisposition because it is the most consistent and the most controllable by a military. 
This theory fits well with multiple case studies.  Game theory can be used to 
explain why strong actors initially employed a conservative strategy of direct attack in 
early operations of the conflicts.  It also shows that after the bulk of enemy capacity to 
resist is destroyed, an indirect strategy would result in a more favorable strategic 
interaction for strong actors.  However, the U.S. has shown repeatedly a failure to 
deliberately switch to an indirect attack strategy in a timely manner.  In the case of the 
U.S. military, this strategic rigidity is attributed to an institutional predisposition that 
favors direct attack to an unacceptable degree.  The time it takes to finally switch to a 
more appropriate indirect attack strategy can have devastating effects on shaping the 
battlefield—even if an effective indirect attack strategy is eventually pursued—as the 
case of U.S. involvement in Vietnam lends support for.  Therefore, the U.S. military 
should alter its institutional predisposition to a more indirect-friendly stance.  One way to 
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accomplish this would be through the creation of an organization that focuses on indirect 
strategies to provide a balance to the existing direct strategy bias. 
Changes that the U.S. military adopts to create a more balanced institutional 
predisposition should institutionalize a strategic look at the desired ends before entering a 
conflict.  The goal of this analysis will be to consciously select an appropriate strategy for 
achieving those ends.  Additionally, there needs to be a champion for the indirect 
strategy—an office that provides indirect approaches to achieving desired strategic goals.  
The pros and cons of the indirect strategy can then be weighed against those of the direct 
strategy to give decision makers viable options.  Additionally, the military needs to 
ensure an effective indirect capability is maintained at all times and not continually re-
learned during conflicts only to be discarded immediately afterwards.  Lastly, a 
mechanism to ensure a timely switch between direct and indirect attack strategies, as 
appropriate, would help bring conflicts to an end much sooner instead of allowing 
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